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INTRODUCTION
Focusing a discussion of intellectual property on a 300-year-old text
may seem unusual, but John Locke's Two Treatises of Government' has an
uncommon place in American intellectual property theory. Historically,
Lockean natural rights informed the Framers' understanding of intellectual
property law.2 Courts also have a long history of using natural law
justifications in intellectual property cases.3 The Lockean perspective has
been particularly appealing to theorists because of its ability to justify
1. JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GovERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press
1988) (1690). Lockc's original purpose was not to provide a comprehensive justification for
private property rights but to refute Sir Robert Filmer's opposing theory in Patriarcha that all
property rights were contingent on the king, who inherited them from Adam. JOHN LOCKE, THE
FIRST TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT, in Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, supra, §§ 1-6; JOHN
LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT, in Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, supra,
§ 25 [hereinafter LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE]; see also ALAN RYAN, PROPERTY AND POLITICAL
THEORY 27-36 (1984) (arguing that Locke's aim was "primarily to sabotage the idea that
patriarchal authority had been absolute and that rulers still possessed it"). One of the most
enduring portions of Locke's argument, however, has been his support for private property in
chapter 5 of the Second Treatise.
2. See THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 239-40 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999);
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in BASIC WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 708 (Philip S. Foner ed., 1944).
3. Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Information as Speech, Information as Goods: Some
Thoughts on Marketplaces and the Bill of Rights, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 665, 690-703 (1992)
(discussing the strong Lockean influences on early intellectual property law in the United States
and England).
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widely varying property systems, 4  ranging from expansive
communitarianism to subsistence-worker-based capitalism. 5 Although
modem intellectual property doctrine has attempted to disavow its
association with natural law justifications, some debate the ability of courts
to adjudicate intellectual property claims without consulting natural law
principles.
6
Revisiting Locke for a theory of intellectual property has become vital
because of two important recent shifts in doctrine and scholarship. First,
statutory and doctrinal innovations have continued to expand private
intellectual property rights.7  Second, academics have increasingly
advocated the importance of the public domain as a way of limiting the
expansion of private property rights. 8 One recent example of the conflict
between private intellectual property rights and the public domain is Eldred
v. Ashcrofl,9 upholding the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act,
which extended the duration of a copyright to the life of the author plus
seventy years. While the government's brief advocating for the copyright
extension emphasized the need for fairness to authors, 10 the petitioners'
brief highlighted that "[p]etitioners are various individuals and businesses
that rely upon speech in the public domain for their creative work and
livelihood."" These arguments were mirrored by amici, including the
Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) on the government's
side, which emphasized the importance of "fair compensation of authors,"'
2
and a group of fifty-three law professors, who stated that "[a]mici are in
4. See RYAN, supra note 1, at 18-22 (describing interpretations of Locke from "modem and
revolutionary" to "positively old-fashioned in 1680").
5. Compare JAMES TULLY, A DISCOURSE ON PROPERTY: JOHN LOCKE AND His
ADVERSARIES 99 (1980) (presenting a communitarian interpretation), with C.B. MACPHERSON,
THE POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM: HOBBES TO LOCKE 217, 250 (1962)
(presenting a capitalist interpretation).
6. See Jeremy Waldron, From Authors to Copiers: Individual Rights and Social Values in
Intellectual Property, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 841, 856 (1993); Alfred C. Yen, Restoring the
Natural Law: Copyright as Labor and Possession, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 517, 521 (1990) (arguing that
because judges seem to incorporate natural law principles, the natural law should not be ignored
when enacting intellectual property statutes).
7. See, e.g., Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112
Stat. 2827 (extending the length of a copyright to the life of the author plus seventy years);
Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994) (extending patent
duration to twenty years).
8. See, e.g., James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the
Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTENP. PROBS. 33 (2003) (contrasting the undesirability of the
recent encroachments on the public domain with the economically sensible historical privatization
of land).
9. 123 S. Ct. 769 (2003).
10. Brief for Respondent at 30-33, Eldred (No. 01-618).
11. Brief for Petitioners at 3, Eldred (No. 01-618).
12. Brief of Amici Curiae Recording Industry Association of America at 19, Eldred (No. 01-
618).
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particular concerned about the recent, rapid expansion of copyright scope
and duration, at the expense of the public domain."'
' 3
Scholars have seen Lockean theory as an essential tool in reconciling
these arguments because the main thrust of Locke's theory is the
reconciliation of strong private property rights with a common of materials
available to all. Locke argues that laborers have a private property right in
the products of their labor because individuals mix their labor with
materials from the common that are free for all to use. The private property
right in an individual's labor is mixed into the product of labor, and thus the
private property right also attaches to the product of labor. He supports this
argument by adding natural law principles that must be followed to
maintain exclusive property rights. The natural law principle that has been
most commonly considered by scholars is the sufficiency proviso, which
requires that the laborer not take too many materials out of the common.
Two substantial criticisms are often directed at Lockean theory. First,
scholars argue that even though Locke claims to reconcile a robust common
with strong private property rights, his property rights swallow the
common. 14 Thus, the object of Lockean theorists, as mirrored in the title of
this Note, is often concerned with limiting the scope of the Lockean
property right. Second, scholars argue that the sufficiency proviso cannot be
fulfilled in a morally compelling way because the common of tangible
goods is inherently scarce.
Previous scholarship concerning Lockean theories of property rights in
intangible goods has focused on the ability of the nonrivalrous
characteristic of intangible goods to eliminate the scarcity problem. This
scholarship began with the publication of two influential articles, one by
Justin Hughes in 198815 and another by Wendy Gordon in 1993,16 and has
been refined in the last decade. 17 A fundamental difference between
13. Brief of Amici Curiae Intellectual Property Law Professors at 1, Eldred (No. 01 -618).
14. ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 174-78 (1974).
15. Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287 (1988).
16. Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the
Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533 (1993).
17. See PETER DRAHOS, A PHILOSOPHY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 41-72 (1996);
Lawrence C. Becker, Deserving To Own Intellectual Property, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 609 (1993);
William Fisher, Theories of Intellectual Property, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL
THEORY OF PROPERTY 168 (Stephen R. Munzer ed., 2001); Edwin C. Hettinger, Justifying
intellectual Property, 18 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 31 (1989); Linda J. Lacey, Of Bread and Roses and
Copyrights, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1532; Adam D. Moore, Intangible Property: Privacy, Power, and
Information Control, 35 AM. PHIL. Q. 365 (1998) [hereinafter Moore, Intangible Property]; Adam
D. Moore, A Lockean Theory of Intellectual Property, 21 HAMLINE L. REV. 65 (1997) [hereinafter
Moore, Lockean Theory]; Tom G. Palmer, Are Patents and Copyrights Morally Justified? The
Philosophy of Property Rights and Ideal Objects, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 817 (1990); Joan
E. Schaffner, Patent Preemption UnLocked, 1995 WIs. L. REV. 1081; Seana Valentine Shiffrin,
Lockean Arguments for Private Intellectual Property, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND
POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY, supra, at 138; Horacio M. Spector, An Outline of a Theory
Justifying Intellectual Property Rights, 8 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 270 (1989); Stewart E. Sterk,
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tangible goods and intangible goods, however, is that intangible goods are
nonrivalrous, which means that they can be used by an infinite number of
people in an infinite number of ways without harming the use value of any
other person, including the initial producer. 18 Previous scholarship has
persuasively argued that because intangible goods are nonrivalrous, the
common of intangible goods contains materials that are not subject to a
scarcity problem and thus that Lockean theory does not fail when it is
applied to intangible goods. Scholars have tended to overemphasize the
importance of this claim, however, by conflating the Lockean common with
a public domain. The Lockean common contains undeveloped materials,
whereas a public domain is composed of developed goods. Although the
Lockean common is quite useful for independent production, the
nonrivalrous nature of intangible goods means that a public domain can be
used to foster incremental innovation, which is much more valuable.
This Note takes a different direction than previous scholarship by
focusing on another of Locke's natural law principles, the waste
prohibition. The waste prohibition forbids a laborer from wasting products
of labor or portions of such products, with the violation resulting in the loss
of private property rights in the portion of the product wasted. I define
Lockean waste in the following way: Waste occurs where a unit of a
product of labor is not put to any use. When scholars have considered the
application of the waste prohibition to intangible goods previously, they
have arrived at polar conclusions, with some asserting that waste rarely
occurs and others claiming that waste always occurs.' 9
The waste prohibition is of negligible importance for tangible goods,
but is immensely important when constructing a Lockean theory of
intangible goods. The waste prohibition is largely a nonissue for tangible
goods because one can exchange money-by definition a nonwasting
good-for units of a product of labor that may be prone to waste. Laborers
will thus have incentives to sell all the units they possess that they will not
use and violations of the waste prohibition will be rare. The nonrivalrous
Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1197 (1996); Waldron, supra note 6;
Lloyd L. Weinreb, Copyright for Functional Expression, 11 HARV. L, REV. 1150 (1998); Yen,
supra note 6; Barbara Friedman, Note, From Deontology to Dialogue: The Cultural
Consequences of Copyright, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 157 (1994); R. Anthony Reese, Note,
Reflections on the Intellectual Commons. Two Perspectives on Copyright Duration and
Reversion, 47 STAN. L. REV. 707 (1995).
These articles often mirror arguments made previously by authors dealing with the
application of Lockean theory to tangible goods. See MACPHERSON, supra note 5; NOZICK, supra
note 14; RYAN, supra note 1; JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY (1988).
18. See Paul M. Romer, Endogenous Technological Change, 98 J. POL. ECON. S71, S73-S78
(1990) (explaining the attributes of rivalry and nonrivalry).
19. Compare Hughes, supra note 15, at 328 (claiming a more narrow potential for violation),
with Hettinger, supra note 17, at 44-45 (asserting a broad violation of the waste prohibition). In
her analysis, Gordon barely considers the waste prohibition. See Gordon, supra note 16, at 1550-
51.
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nature of intangible goods can be characterized as the production of an
unlimited number of "intangible units" at the initial creation of any
intangible good. Although the limited number of units of a tangible good
can usually be converted into nonwasting money, the unlimited number of
intangible units suggests that the laborer will not be able or willing to
convert all of the intangible units into money whenever any intangible good
is produced. The combination of nonconversion and nonuse constitutes a
violation of the waste prohibition. As the waste prohibition is enforced
through the loss of property rights in the wasted intangible units, the waste
prohibition creates what I call a Lockean fair use right. Price discrimination
allows greater conversion of intangible units into money but is an imperfect
solution due to practical difficulties in attaining perfect price
discrimination.
This Note also examines the implications of government regulation on
Lockean intellectual property rights and compares a Lockean regime with
current U.S. intellectual property doctrine and theory. The establishment of
a government allows much more variety in the scope of private property
rights under Lockean theory, but the Lockean fair use right binds civil
governments in much the same way that it binds individuals in the state of
nature. Although the theory and doctrine of copyright fair use shares many
characteristics with Lockean fair use, the current U.S. fair use right is more
limited than the Lockean right. One example considered in this Note is that
strong government support for anticircumvention measures may violate
Lockean principles if the ability to police the waste prohibition is not
protected. An even larger difference is that there is no coherent patent fair
use right in the United States, although such a right would be demanded
under a Lockean regime.
This argument will be fleshed out in the remainder of this Note. Part I
introduces general Lockean concepts, focusing on the impacts of the
nonrivalry of intangible goods on the common and the waste prohibition.
Part II applies Lockean concepts in an economic framework, demonstrating
a fair use right in a Lockean state of nature. Part III considers the transition
of society into a civil government, with its attendant changes in the scope of
property rights in intangible goods. Part III also applies the Lockean
analysis of this Note to two areas of current intellectual property debate-
the anticircumvention provisions in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
(DMCA) and the enforcement of drug patents in developing countries. Part
IV concludes.
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I. ELEMENTS OF A LOCKEAN THEORY OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
Though the Earth, and all inferior Creatures be common to all
Men, yet every Man has a Property in his own Person....
Whatsoever, then, he removes out of the State that Nature hath
provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his Labour with, and joyned
to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his
Property.... For this Labour being the unquestionable Property of
the Labourer, no Man but he can have a right to what that is once
joyned to, at least where there is enough, and as good left in
common for others.
20
This single paragraph, section 27 in the Second Treatise of
Government, outlines nearly all of Locke's natural law justification for
private property rights. Stated simply, each individual has a property right
in her own labor. When the individual combines her labor with materials
from the common, this property right extends to the items she has removed
from the common due to the mixing of her property-laden labor with the
items.21 This individual may continue to remove items from the common so
20. LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE, supra note 1, § 27.
21. Scholars have described the normative appeal of Locke's labor-mixing argument in the
following way. Hughes finds that Locke has "immediate, intuitive appeal: it seems as though
people do work to produce ideas and that the value of these ideas ... depends solely upon the
individual's mental 'work."' Hughes, supra note 15, at 300. Lloyd Weinreb adds that this intuition
is stronger for intangible goods because creation is "more plainly and completely the product of
the author's labor." Weinreb, supra note 17, at 1222.
There are a number of interpretations supporting the Lockean labor concept of which I will
briefly describe four. See Fisher, supra note 17, at 184-85 (describing six Lockean arguments to
justify private ownership). First, Locke relies heavily on the commands of God to justify the
concepts of his natural law theory. See RYAN, supra note 1, at 25-32 (describing Locke's theistic
justifications for natural law principles). Second, Adam Moore argues that the combination of
labor and the sufficiency proviso creates a "Pareto-based" moral principle: Once an individual
expends labor, she has a "weak presumptive claim" to the work that turns into a strong
exclusionary right if the sufficiency proviso is fulfilled. Moore, Intangible Property, supra note
17, at 368-70. Third, Hughes suggests that Lockean theory may be premised on an "avoidance"
view of labor. Hughes, supra note 15, at 302-05. He then describes normative and instrumental
arguments supporting this view. The normative argument states that the "unpleasantness of labor
should be rewarded with property," whereas the instrumental argument rewards labor with
property "because people must be motivated to perform labor." Id. at 303. The normative
argument can be used to support a natural law right, whereas the instrumental argument is framed
as a utilitarian argument. Cf ALAN RYAN, PROPERTY 69 (1987) ("The point of thinking in
proprietary terms is to avoid utilitarian considerations, not to succumb to them."). Fourth, Robert
Nozick is most famous for emphasizing a libertarian theory of rights. NOZICK, supra note 14, at
333-34. This justification shares much with the theistic conception, but relies on each individual's
ownership of himself (rather than ownership by God) to provide the initial justification for
property rights.
For purposes of this Note, I assume that labor mixing is coherent and sufficient to justify the
private property right that Locke suggests, although numerous scholars have offered various
counterarguments against basing private property rights on one's labor. First, in a somewhat
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long as she adheres to three independent conditions: the no harm principle,
the independent production principle, and the waste prohibition.
First, the natural law broadly prohibits an actor from harming another
in ,,22in his "Life, Health,... [or] Possessions. Rather than examining the "no
harm" principle in the abstract, however, Locke narrowed it to a discussion
of two specific provisos: the sufficiency proviso and the taking
prohibition.2 3 The sufficiency proviso requires the laborer to leave "enough,
and as good" for others to take from the common as well. 24 The sufficiency
proviso also lends the theory much of its normative appeal because the
laborer who asserts a property right but "leaves as much as another can
make use of, does as good as take nothing at all",25 from the common. The
taking prohibition proscribes another from taking a good that a laborer has
removed from the common. 6 In order to violate the taking prohibition, an
complicated argument, Jeremy Waldron contends that the idea of labor mixing itself is incoherent.
See WALDRON, supra note 17, at 184-89. Second, scholars debate about what amount of labor and
how much mixing is required to create a property right. Edwin Hettinger is content with a
property right based on a minimal amount of labor and labor mixing. See Hettinger, supra note 17,
at 37. Nozick argues that a minimal amount of labor will be insufficient to justify a property right,
suggesting that if someone labors on the sea by dumping a single can of tomato juice in it, he
hasn't gained a property right in the sea but has "foolishly dissipated" his tomato juice. NOZICK,
supra note 14, at 174-75. Alan Ryan approaches this concern from the mixing perspective,
arguing that harvesting an apple provides the laborer a right in the apple and not the tree from
which it was plucked. RYAN, supra note 1, at 32-35. Third, labor mixing does not necessarily
justify a right to the whole value of the good, as opposed to the value related to the effort
expended. See WALDRON, supra note 17, at 205; see also Reese, supra note 17, at 714-15 (setting
a "fair return on investment" as the appropriate scope). Fourth, postmodem theories describing the
deconstruction of the author undermine the ability to assert author-based entitlements and,
therefore, also undermine the ability to rely on an author's labor to justify a property right. See
Waldron, supra note 6, at 878-79. Finally, if one follows Hughes's avoidance theory as the true
normative justification for labor providing a property right, enjoyable labor might not be rewarded
with a property right. See Hughes, supra note 15, at 302-04, 313-14 (describing arguments that
enjoyable labor should not be rewarded with a property right and finding that these arguments
justify the idea-expression dichotomy in copyright law).
22. LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE, supra note 1, § 6.
23. Cf. RYAN, supra note 21, at 64 (explaining that a theory of natural rights begins in a
minimal way, but must be supplemented by case-by-case interpretations of what the no harm
principle means).
24. LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE, supra note 1, § 27. Scholars disagree on the appropriate
interpretation of Locke's sufficiency proviso. Compare Hughes, supra note 15, at 297 (strong
sufficiency proviso), with WALDRON, supra note 17, at 210-11 (weak sufficiency proviso).
25. LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE, supra note 1, § 33; Gordon, supra note 16, at 1565 (stating
that the sufficiency proviso "serves as Locke's bedrock response to the complaints of the
nonpropertied"); Hughes, supra note 15, at 297-98 (arguing that the sufficiency proviso "protects
Locke's labor justification from any attacks"). A recent interpretation of Locke focuses on the
command to make full use of God's grant of the commons and finds that the inherent
characteristics of intangible goods require that no property rights be allowed in order to make full
use of the initial common. Shiffrin, supra note 17, at 144, 151-53, 166-67.
26. LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE, supra note 1, §§ 32-34; Gordon, supra note 16, at 1543
(describing the taking prohibition as a duty not to interfere). Waldron's deconstruction-of-the-
author argument may suggest that users can never actually take a work. Because Hamlet is "in
effect rewritten or reconstructed every time it is read," people are not merely taking but are
coauthors. See Waldron, supra note 6, at 878. This argument seems limited to a person's
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actor must not only take a good, but this taking must also harm the other
party. 27 Consensual trades and the giving of gifts do not violate the taking
28prohibition.
Second is the right to independent production, which Locke explicitly
describes, stating, "[T]hough Men had a Right to appropriate, by their
Labour... [y]et this could not be [so] much, nor to the Prejudice of
others... who would use the same Industry.,, 29 The ability to independently
produce a good is restricted when the sufficiency proviso is violated or
when the ability to labor is controlled.30 In order to claim a property right in
the state of nature, therefore, individuals must not violate the sufficiency
proviso or control the ability of another to labor.3 1 Finally, Lockean theory
prohibits the waste of goods removed from the common. The waste
prohibition will be considered in detail throughout this Note.
Locke relates these property-creating elements to three societal
arrangements, which represent a rough progression in the development of
property rights and are legitimated by consent and continued adherence to
the natural law. 32 Locke describes a "State of Nature," which he then
divides into a state of nature before trade is introduced and one after trade is
established.33  Locke's third societal arrangement envisions civil
government regulation of property.34 To move from the initial state of
nature to one incorporating a trade system requires the consent of the
relationship to the intangible good itself because it would be much harder to argue that a person
cannot take a tangible embodiment of an intangible good, for example through stealing a CD.
27. If the taking prohibition absolutely barred taking without regard to the harm to the owner,
the waste prohibition could not be enforced in the state of nature. Additionally, independent
production is not only permitted but protected even though it harms the owner's competitive
advantage. Independent production does not violate the taking prohibition because an independent
producer harms but does not take.
28. LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE, supra note 1, §§ 46-48; see also id. §§ 17-19 (prohibiting
coerced action).
29. Id. § 37. The independent production principle is strengthened by Locke's views on
equality in the state of nature. See id. § 4.
30. Compare NOZICK, supra note 14, at 178-82 (focusing on the sufficiency proviso's
implications for independent production), and Gordon, supra note 16, at 1582 (same), with
Moore, Intangible Property, supra note 17, at 367-71 (tying the right to independently create to
the importance of personal autonomy in Lockean theory), Palmer, supra note 17, at 829-35
(arguing against intellectual property rights as a "restriction on the liberty of everyone"), and
Sterk, supra note 17, at 1234-35 (discussing the importance of freedom of action).
31. LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE, supra note 1, §§ 27, 33-37.
32. Id. § 135; MACPHERSON, supra note 5, at 210-11; RYAN, supra note 21, at 62;
WALDRON, supra note 17, at 163.
33. LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE, supra note 1, §§ 4-6, 47-51.
34. Id. §§ 77-243.
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trading parties and the consent of society to introduce money.35 Specific
consent by individuals is required to transition into a civil government.
36
Scholars have debated the importance and logical coherence of the
Lockean elements throughout the centuries, largely concluding that
Lockean theory is either inapplicable or morally unpersuasive. The most
damning arguments for Lockean theory have generally centered on Locke's
sufficiency proviso. If the proviso is interpreted strongly to mean that the
laborer must leave for the next laborer exactly the same opportunity to
appropriate from the common, any scarcity in the common will cause
Lockean theory to fail in its effort to justify property rights.37 It is not
difficult, therefore, to demonstrate that Lockean theory fails for tangible
goods because scarcity is an inherent quality of tangible goods.38 The
sufficiency proviso has also been interpreted in two weak ways, each of
which robs the theory of its moral appeal. The first interpretation narrows
the scope of the common; the second narrows the group of persons who
have access to the common. First, the scope of the enough-and-as-good
requirement is narrowed to a level of subsistence.3 9 Thus, weak sufficiency
does not provide a right to use of the common, but merely provides a right
to use whatever has not yet been appropriated from the common so long as
all laborers can at least maintain subsistence. 4 ) Second, C.B. MacPherson
has argued that Locke actually intended to narrow the group of people to
35. See id. §§ 46-50. But see WALDRON, supra note 17, at 224-25 (arguing against the need
for societal consent to the money system).
36. LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE, supra note 1, § 14 (stating that the consent required for trade
is insufficient to establish a civil government); id. §§ 15, 22, 95 (requiring the individual's "own
Consent" to move to civil government).
37. In the ongoing debate between Filmer and Locke, Filmer argued that private property
rights cannot be created when a strong no harm requirement is combined with a scarce common
for tangible goods. See RYAN, supra note 1, at 16-17. Either the no harm proviso would be
violated or the people "must sit back and starve." WALDRON, supra note 17, at 212-13. Locke put
forth three arguments in an unsuccessful attempt to support a theory incorporating the strong
sufficiency proviso. First, Locke introduced a subsistence proviso, stating that an individual has a
right to subsistence that transcends others' rights to property removed from the common. LOCKE,
SECOND TREATISE, supra note 1, § 25. Second, in America (at least in 1689) and during other
periods of history, land was so abundant as compared to the number of people that even a strong
sufficiency proviso would be upheld. Id. §§ 36-38. But see WALDRON, supra note 17, at 214
(arguing that property acquired through initial appropriation may violate the right for later persons
to appropriate). Third, Locke argued that the people can bind themselves together through
common consent in a civil government, where they can divide up the common. LOCKE, SECOND
TREATISE, supra note 1, §§ 2-3. Unfortunately, these arguments fail to provide a morally
compelling justification because they merely allow private ownership in historical times, provide
a subsistence right in the modem era, or eliminate the natural law justification for private property
rights independent of a civil government altogether.
38. It is in this situation that Lockean theory becomes subject to Ryan's objection that it
"goes terribly wrong when applied to any goods whose supply cannot be expanded indefinitely."
RYAN, supra note 21, at 69.
39. See WALDRON, supra note 17, at 153-57.
40. Under this interpretation, Locke's theory becomes a "First Labour" theory. Id. at 173-76.
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whom the sufficiency proviso applies.4' MacPherson claims that members
of the laboring class were not seen as full members of society and therefore
they could be ignored when considering the sufficiency proviso. To sum up,
Lockean theory applied to tangible goods is thus ineffective under a strong
interpretation of the sufficiency proviso and morally unappealing under a
weak interpretation of the sufficiency proviso.
A. Fundamental Differences Between Tangible and Intangible Goods
Fundamental differences between tangible and intangible goods have
significant ramifications for the scope of private property rights justified by
Lockean theories of property. Consider three types of goods: tangible
goods, intangible goods, and tangible embodiments of intangible goods.
The first difference is in the physical or nonphysical nature of the good.
Tangible goods are composed of, and defined by reference to, tangible,
physical materials. At the other extreme, intangible goods are composed of
intangible, nonphysical materials and are defined conceptually rather than
physically. Tangible embodiments of intangible goods are combinations of
tangible and intangible goods, with the tangible good being used to
communicate and store the intangible good.
A second difference between tangible goods, intangible goods, and
tangible embodiments of intangible goods is the rivalrous or nonrivalrous
nature of the goods. As defined by Paul Romer, "A purely rival good has
the property that its use by one firm or person precludes its use by another;
a purely nonrival good has the property that its use by one firm or person in
no way limits its use by another." 42 Due to their physical nature, both
tangible goods and tangible embodiments of intangible goods are rivalrous
and thus can only be used by one person at a time. Intangible goods,
however, are nonrivalrous, which means that at the same time different
people may use the same intangible good in the same way or in different
ways without affecting any other person's ability to use the intangible good.
A third difference is that only intangible goods may be obtained
without harming the original holder's use value in the good. Tangible goods
may be obtained in one of two ways: independent production or acquiring a
tangible good from someone else. Intangible goods may also be obtained in
those two ways: independent production or acquiring a tangible
embodiment of an intangible good from someone else. The acquisition of a
tangible good or a tangible embodiment of an intangible good from
someone else deprives the initial holder of the use of that good. Intangible
goods are different, however, in that an individual may make a copy of the
41. See MACPHERSON, supra note 5, at 222-24, 247.
42. Romer, supra note 18, at S73-S74.
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
1188 [Vol. 112:1179
Limiting Locke
intangible good using her own materials to create the tangible embodiment
without depriving the initial holder of his use value in the good.43
These characteristics make intangible goods at once unlimited and
singular. There are three ways in which an intangible good has unlimited
qualities. First, a single intangible good may be used by an unlimited
number of people at the same time. Second, an intangible good may be used
in an unlimited number of ways at the same time. Third, once an intangible
good has been created, it need never be produced again but can be copied.
The initial productive labor is therefore expandable without limit. An
intangible good is also inherently singular; each individual can have
multiple tangible copies but can have only one unit of a single intangible
good. Suppose one person has ten apples and ten copies of the movie
Gladiator. If asked the question "Do you have an apple?" the person could
reply "Yes. I have ten apples." If asked the question "Do you have the
movie Gladiator?" the person could reply "Yes. I have ten copies of the
movie Gladiator." The person could not, however, reply that he has ten
copies of an apple or that he has ten movies called "Gladiator." The
inability to state that one has ten movies called "Gladiator" shows the
singularity of intangible goods in that each individual may only have one
unit of an intangible good but may have multiple tangible embodiments of
an intangible good, each of which is a "copy" of the others. Intangible
goods are therefore quantified by their relation to individuals, but tangible
embodiments of intangible goods are quantified by the number of physical
copies.
The unlimited and singular characteristics of intangible goods can be
modeled as a multidimensional space. I will consider two dimensions, the
first of which is the unlimited number of potential users. The second
dimension is the unlimited number of uses of the intangible good. Although
other dimensions could also be considered,4 each set of coordinates will
define an "intangible unit" in this Note. The infinitely expandable initial
productive labor also means that the whole intangible good space-the sum
of the unlimited number of intangible units-is formed at the initial
creation of an intangible good. Copying the intangible goods into tangible
embodiments of intangible goods is the only labor that remains after the
initial creation; independent production is not necessary.
Although intangible goods have always been nonrival, digital
technology and the Internet have changed the ability to conceptualize the
unlimited nature of intangible goods. First, use of the digital medium makes
tangible embodiments of intangible goods much less tangible. John Perry
43. The initial holder of the intangible good may also make a copy, creating a tangible
embodiment that she can convey to others.
44. An example of such an additional dimension would be time.
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Barlow has argued that intangible goods in an Internet era are like wine
without bottles, i.e., that tangible embodiments are no longer necessary, but
that people can transmit "pure thought or something very much like
thought: voltage conditions darting around the Net at the speed of light."
45
Second, it is also easier to envision an unlimited number of intangible units
because it is not difficult to imagine a single copy of a popular song quickly
multiplying into a million copies through the use of file-sharing programs at
virtually no cost. Finally, the digital medium shows the high "plasticity" of
intangible goods, which refers to the ability to use an intangible good in any
number of adaptive ways.
46
The conception of nonrivalry employed in this Note will be relatively
thin, thereby avoiding many philosophical debates on the concept of the
intangible good. I will assume that the intangible good can be defined
independently of any human who possesses it. 47 An example of such a
fungible intangible good might be a mathematical formula, whereas a
Rorschach inkblot test is a paradigm example of an intangible good that is
highly dependent on its relationship to specific individuals. Additionally, a
thicker conception of intangible goods might include the requirement of
some effort on the part of the recipient in order for an intangible unit to be
created and transferred.4 8 However, because this requirement does not
influence the conclusions from the analysis in this Note, this thicker
conception will not be considered.49
B. The Utility of a Lockean Common of Intangible Goods
Locke's common of tangible goods consists of undeveloped tangible
materials that are available to all and created by the "spontaneous hand of
Nature." 50 Locke characterizes the undeveloped materials in the common as
45. John Perry Barlow, Selling Wine Without Bottles: The Economy of Mind on the Global
Net, at http://www.eff.org/IP/idea-economy.article (last visited Nov. 12, 2002) (highlighting that
"[d]igital technology is detaching information from the physical plane").
46. Pamela Samuelson, Copyright, Digital Data, and Fair Use in Digital Networked
Environments, in THE ELECTRONIC SUPERHIGHWAY: THE SHAPE OF TECHNOLOGY AND LAW To
CoME 117, 121-22 (Ejan Mackaay et al. eds., 1995).
47. Philosophical debates associated with the concept of an author are one example of where
this assumption might not hold for all intangible goods. See, e.g., Waldron, supra note 6, at 878
(arguing that deconstruction-of-the-author theories suggest that intangible goods aren't fungible
across different people).
48. For example, if the intangible good is a scientific concept, such as the law of gravity, a
thicker conception might posit that the intangible good has not been transferred unless the user of
the good actually understands the concept.
49. If one considers a transaction between a seller and a buyer of an intangible good, the
understanding requirement only adds costs to the buyer's side; it does not create an additional
seller-side expense. Thus, the marginal cost of distributing these partially completed intangible
goods is still zero, and the analysis of the Note holds.
50. See LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE, supra note 1, §§ 25-26, 34-36, 47-48.
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"unassisted Nature,' which have little immediate value but can be greatly
enhanced in value through labor. 52 Examples of undeveloped materials in
the common include land, animals, and wild fruit.53 The fact that these are
tangible goods means that they are rivalrous and that only one individual
may use them at a time. Universal access to the common facilitates an
"equality of opportunity ' 54 to independently produce.
A Lockean "common of intangible goods, 55 differs in important
respects from the Lockean common of tangible goods. The most important
similarity, however, is that the common of intangible goods also consists
only of undeveloped materials that are a product of the spontaneous hand of
nature. Just as the common of tangible goods is characterized by Locke as
"unassisted nature," one might characterize the common of intangible
goods as "uncomprehended nature." Although it is difficult and somewhat
unnecessary for purposes of this Note to determine what materials are
contained in the common of intangible goods, these might include natural
facts or mathematical proofs.5 6 The most important difference between the
common of intangible goods and the common of tangible goods is the
nonrivalrous nature of the undeveloped intangible materials in the former.
Nonrivairy means that there is infinite allocative capacity of materials
contained in the common of intangible goods. 57 The result of the infinite
51. Id.§ 42.
52. Id. § 37 ("For the provisions serving to the support of humane life, produced by one acre
of inclosed and cultivated land, are. . ten times more, than those, which are yielded by an acre of
Land, of an equal richnesse, lyeing wast in the common.").
53. Id. §§ 25-26.
54. See Sterk, supra note 17, at 1234-35,
55. See Gordon, supra note 16, at 1555 (coining this phrase); see also Hughes, supra note 15,
at 323 (describing a "common of potential ideas").
56. See Fisher, supra note 17, at 186 (discussing materials that might be included in a
Lockean common of intangible goods). It might be easier to consider three types of intellectual
labor and then work backward to determine whether the underlying materials can be characterized
as uncomprehended nature. First, consider the intellectual labor of observing the natural world to
obtain facts. Facts produced by observing the natural world certainly seem to be elements of a
Lockean common, Second, consider logical reasoning. Explanations of natural phenomena
derived by reasoning from known facts may seem to contain an intangible material that is a
product of the "spontaneous hand of nature," but creative thought experiments about phenomena
that have never occurred in nature are much less obviously a spontaneous product of nature.
Third, one may combine observable facts with logical reasoning to produce what one might call
an invention. These three types of labor correlate loosely with Shiffrin's description of three types
of commons, which consist of mere discovery of existing intangible goods, a combination of
human uniqueness with the subject matter of intangible goods, and creation ex nihilo, i.e, an
empty common with human labor alone responsible for the creation of intangible goods. Shiffrin,
supra note 17, at 158-66.
57. Provisioning refers to producing a good, whereas allocation refers to distributing an
existing good to individuals. The common of intangible goods is surely expandable in the
allocative sense. See Yochai Benkler, Coase'v Penguin, or, Linux and The Nature of the Firm,
112 YALE L.J. 369, 438 (2002) ("Information production entails only a provisioning problem.
Because information is nonrival, once it is produced no allocation problem exists."). A more
difficult question is whether the common is infinitely expandable in the provisioning sense, i.e.,
whether there are an infinite number of potential intangible goods.
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allocative capacity of undeveloped intangible goods is a much more robust
ability to independently produce.
The emphasis that previous scholars have placed on the common of
intangible goods and, by association, on the sufficiency proviso has been
misplaced.58 For example, Hughes noted that "ideas fit Locke's notion of a
'common' better than does physical property" because "the inexhaustibility
condition is more satisfied; each idea can be used by an unlimited number
of individuals." 59 As shown above, the nonrivalrous character of the
common of intangible goods merely produces a strong ability to
independently produce. The ability to independently produce is important,
but it is much less important than the potential ability to use already
developed intangible goods as inputs in the development of further
intangible goods. 60 As examples, the nonrivalrous nature of a mathematical
equation describing a physical law is useful not because everyone can
figure it out on his or her own, but because everyone can use the law
directly after one person has discovered it, and the nonrivalrous nature of
books allows them to be used indirectly as inspirations for further works.
The potential gains from using previously developed intangible goods in the
development of further intangible goods may be larger for different types of
intangible goods.
61
Intellectual property scholars advocate more strongly for a robust
public domain than for a Lockean common, but those scholars who have
previously considered Lockean theory have largely conflated the two. A
regime that would facilitate the use of developed intangible goods as inputs
in the production of additional intangible goods is a public domain, which
is a set of developed intangible goods that may be freely used by a set of
individuals. A public domain is not equivalent to the Lockean common,
however, because the Lockean common contains undeveloped materials,
whereas a public domain contains developed goods. Gordon's analysis fails
because she conflates the Lockean common with a public domain.62
Barbara Friedman has described Gordon's conflation this way: "For Locke,
the common property was an inheritance from God .... Gordon, by
58. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 16, at 1563 (emphasizing the Lockean proviso); Sterk,
supra note 17, at 1235 (same).
59. Hughes, supra note 15, at 315.
60. See generally Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative
Research and the Patent Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 29 (1991) (analyzing the importance of previous
innovation on the scope of patent protection).
61. See Julie E. Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in the Software
Industry, 89 CAL. L. REv. 1, 39-42 (2001) (arguing that the software industry is especially
characterized by the reuse of previously developed code).
62. See Gordon, supra note 16, at 1559; see also Schaffner, supra note 17, at 1094, 1106-10.
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contrast, in speaking of culture as a common of intangibles, is referring to
works and ideas that are manifestly the product of human labor.,
63
To summarize, the nonrivalrous nature of intangible goods creates a
robust common that can be used for independent production, but this
common does not include intangible goods developed through human
effort. As we shall see in the next Section, however, the nonrivalrous nature
of intangible goods has important ramifications for Locke's waste
prohibition, which does provide access to developed intangible goods.
64
C. The Primacy of the Waste Prohibition
Locke describes the waste prohibition as follows:
Nothing was made by God for Man to spoil or destroy.
... [H]e who gathered as much of the wild Fruit... by placing
any of his Labor on them, did thereby acquire a Propriety in them:
but if they perished, in his Possession, without their due use... he
offended against the common Law of Nature, and was liable to be
punished ....
The same measures governed the Possession of Land too ....
[I]f either the Grass of his Inclosure rotted on the Ground, or the
Fruit of his planting perished without gathering, and laying up, this
part of the Earth, notwithstanding his Inclosure, was still to be
looked on as Waste, and might be the Possession of any other.
... The exceeding of the bounds of his just Property [does not
lie] in the largeness of his Possession, but the perishing of any thing
uselessly in it.
65
Various justifications for the waste prohibition have been posited. The
only justification independent of the no harm principle, and the one that I
63. Friedman, supra note 17, at 166. Gordon claims that everyone has a Lockean natural right
to the public domain, in which she includes "creations whose period of protection has expired."
Gordon, supra note 16, at 1559. Her analysis conflates actions available under a civil government
with those available in the state of nature because expiration of property rights in unabandoned
property requires a forced taking, which only a government can legitimate.
64. The transition to civil government establishes the ability to create a public domain. See
infra notes 156-159 and accompanying text.
65. LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE, supra note 1, §§ 31, 37-38, 46; see also WALDRON, supra
note 17, at 161 (arguing that waste amounts to abandonment of the property).
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adopt for this Note, is that the waste prohibition is an objective moral
criterion, i.e., waste is wrong, or, in Lockean terms, "Nothing was made by
God for Man to spoil or destroy." Alan Ryan claims that this independent
justification for the waste prohibition was Locke's primary intention. 66
Compelling moral support for this interpretation can be found in the patent
drug debate that is discussed in more detail in Subsection III.C.2. Two
additional justifications, however, can be gathered from Locke's discussion.
First, the waste prohibition seems to recognize a scarcity of resources, as
Locke argues that the waste prohibition prevents a person from
"ingross[ing] as much as he will. '67 Second, wasted goods harm the laborer
herself because she has wasted her labor that was mixed into the good.68
These additional justifications will not be considered in this Note; the first
because it does not apply to a common of intangible goods, and the second
because the no harm principle can be largely alienated from the individual
in a transition to a civil government, but the objective moral criterion
remains binding even after a transition.
The waste prohibition is violated if the laborer does not take advantage
of the use value that he has added through his labor for both easily spoilable
and relatively nonspoilable goods. First, the individual may allow a good
prone to spoil, such as wild fruit, to rot in his possession. Second, the
individual may waste a good that is not prone to spoil, such as land, if he
does not take advantage of the use value that he has added through his
labor. The second type of waste can be discerned from the above quotation
in that it is not only the grass or the fruit but also the land that is lost when
the products of labor are not put to their due use. The use value may be
directly related to the property, such as the consumptive value of owned
fruit, or it may be indirectly related to the property, such as the use value of
crops grown on owned land.
I posit the following definition of waste under Lockean theory: Waste
occurs where a unit of a product of labor is not put to any use. This
definition focuses on Locke's concern that goods be put to their due use.
The rivalrous nature of tangible goods means that questions of
divisibility-i.e., determining what constitutes a unit-will be difficult but
important in ascertaining violations of the waste prohibition. For example,
allowing one tract of a farmer's land to lie fallow for a time in order to
preserve its later productiveness might not violate the waste prohibition,
whereas letting some portion of a farmer's harvested crop spoil would
violate the waste prohibition. The nonrivalrous nature of intangible goods
66. RYAN, supra note 1, at 37 (finding that the waste prohibition teaches that "things have
certain natural and proper uses, such that it would be perverse to use them otherwise").
67. LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE, supra note 1, § 31.
68. Hughes, supra note 15, at 327-28.
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means that intangible goods are divisible without limit, with the
fundamental unit being the intangible unit defined above. 69
The penalty associated with a violation of the waste prohibition is the
loss of exclusionary property rights in the good, but the prohibition does not
create an affirmative duty to prevent waste.7 ° If only part of the good is
wasted, property rights are only lost for that portion of the good that is
wasted. 71 An example is a landowner who harvests ninety percent of the
land but is unable to use the remaining ten percent of the crops. The way in
which this penalty is enforced will depend on whether the laborer is acting
in the state of nature or under a civil government. In the state of nature,
enforcement of natural law rights is left up to individuals, or in Locke's
words, "in the State of Nature, every one has the Executive Power of the
Law of Nature." 72 In the state of nature, therefore, the waste prohibition is
enforced by individuals who act in individual self-interest in seeking the
property. Although Lockean theory normally forbids individuals from
taking the property of another, the enforcement mechanism for the waste
prohibition is that the wasted good may "be the Possession of any other., 73
Just as Locke can claim for private property rights that a person who
appropriates from a nonscarce common "does as good as take nothing at
all",74 from the common, an individual who polices the waste prohibition
can be said to have done as good as take nothing at all from the owner.
Only where the laborer obtains no use value from a good must he allow
69. Hughes describes a more limited scope for the applicability of the waste prohibition for
intangible goods. See id. at 327-29. He argues that, unlike food, ideas are not perishable because
they always retain some inherent future value as compared to the absolute loss associated with
food spoilage. He also argues that so long as there is no harm to the laborer-i.e., that the labor
produced an overall benefit to the laborer-limiting distribution of intangible goods does not
violate the waste prohibition. Hughes's analysis is flawed for two important reasons. First, he
ignores the nonrivalrous characteristic of intangible goods. Due to the unlimited number of
intangible units, limiting the ability of users to obtain copies of the intangible good does result in
the kind of absolute loss that he describes for food. Second, waste to the individual is only one of
three alternative ways of conceiving of the waste prohibition. He misses the fact that although an
individual might be perfectly satisfied with the level of use to which the good has been put, if the
intangible units are not put to their due use, a violation of the waste prohibition has occurred.
Hettinger comes closer to the analysis presented in this Note. He argues that placing a
nonzero price on intangible goods is "clearly wasteful," stating that "[h]ow wasteful private
ownership of intellectual property is depends on how beneficial those products would be to those
who are excluded from their use as a result." Hettinger, supra note 17, at 44-45. He fails,
however, to draw any conclusions from this analysis, to consider the important relationship of
money to the waste prohibition, or to recognize the importance of the waste prohibition applying
to a portion of the goods rather than the use of the good being partially wasteful.
70. LoCKE, SFCOND TREATISE, supra note 1, §§ 36-37.
71. See id. § 46 (arguing that a laborer can avoid violating the waste prohibition by giving
"away a part to any body else").
72. Id. § 13. Problems associated with self-bias and limited enforcement power will be
considered in more detail in Section I1LA, which discusses enforceability as a reason to move into
a civil government.
73. Id. § 38.
74. Id. § 33.
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others access to it under the waste prohibition. Conversely, if the laborer
receives no use value from the good, another will do no injury to the
laborer-and thus, will not violate the taking prohibition-by taking the
good. In other words, only where the laborer violates the waste
prohibition can another take the good without violating the taking
prohibition. Therefore, justified taking can be seen as a natural way to
police the waste prohibition.
76
1I. A LOCKEAN THEORY OF FAIR USE IN THE STATE OF NATURE
Property rights are maintained if one uses the products of labor, but
Locke argues that trading a good for money, which I will call "money
substitution," also avoids the waste prohibition. Locke asserts that the
invention of money effectively eliminates violations of the waste
prohibition because perishable goods can be exchanged for nonperishable
money. 7 This argument holds so long as Locke's assumption that laborers
are willing and able to limit their production to goods that they can use or
sell is plausible, which it is for tangible goods. 8 As this Part will show by
applying Locke's waste prohibition in a modem economic framework,79
this assumption fails for intangible goods. In fact, a producer of intangible
goods acting in her self-interest will purposely violate the waste
prohibition. The primary distinction is that a laborer can limit the number of
copies of a tangible good, whereas the creation of an intangible good
produces an unlimited number of intangible units.
75. In some cases, the good cannot be taken without harming the owner. Here, the owner's
refusal to allow taking can be seen as avoiding a harm. Thus, it can be argued that he is obtaining
some value because a harm is being avoided. Preventing arbitrage may be an example of a reason
to prevent copying even where the intangible good is ostensibly being wasted. For a more
systematic treatment of these arguments, see supra notes 115-116 and accompanying text.
76. For a discussion of situations where the laborer and the enforcers have conflicting natural
rights, see supra notes 119-120 and accompanying text.
77. LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE, supra note 1, §§ 46-47 (explaining that money is "some
lasting thing that Men might keep without spoiling" as compared to the "greatest part of things
really useful to the Life of Man" that are "generally things of short duration"); MACPHERSON,
supra note 5, at 204 (arguing that the waste limitation "seemed to Locke to be obviously
transcended by the introduction of money"). Locke also claims that the introduction of money
opens up the world to greater appropriation. LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE, supra note 1, §§ 48-50.
Although Locke is correct to some extent that money acts as a magnifier or release valve, the
introduction of money is just one portion of the gains from a market system.
78. Locke's reliance on both the ability and desire to limit production can be implied from the
following statement: "Supposing an Island... [wihat reason could any one have there to enlarge
his Possessions beyond the use of his Family, and a plentiful supply to its Consumption... ?"
LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE, supra note 1, § 48.
79. The application of Lockean principles in an economic framework does not change the
natural rights character of the argument into a utilitarian analysis. Scholars who have similarly
applied Lockean principles in a modem economic framework include Nozick and John Stick. See
NOZICK, supra note 14, at 178-82; John Stick, Turning Rawls into Nozick and Back Again, 8t
NW. U. L. REV. 363, 396-99 (1987) (considering the implications of the sufficiency proviso
primarily on the transfer of tangible goods).
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The waste prohibition requires that each unit either be put to some use
or sold to retain a property right in the good. In other words, property rights
are lost to the extent that the laborer does not achieve "total money
substitution," which I will define as the conversion into money of all units
of a product of labor that an individual will not personally use. External
factors, including the demand curve for the good, will determine the
maximum price that the laborer can charge to achieve total money
substitution. External factors also determine whether the laborer is a price
taker-meaning that the amount of goods that the laborer offers to sell does
not influence the price that the laborer can charge--or, at the other extreme,
whether the laborer can act as a monopolist.
This Part will begin by considering only two ideal-type market
situations: price taking or monopoly power. Additionally, it will be limited
to considering two potential choices by the laborer: how many goods to
produce and at what price to sell the goods. Although the analysis in this
Note is similar to Locke's own argument in sections 46 to 51, I set out
Locke's assumptions more explicitly and consider more carefully a
laborer's likely pricing decisions. The assumption that all goods are sold at
a single market price is followed in Section II.A but will be relaxed when
price discrimination is considered in Section II.B. Enforceability will be
assumed throughout this Part, but will be considered in the analysis of Part
III. The demand curve for the good will be assumed static and known. I will
assume, following Locke, that laborers generally act in their self-interest. 80
A. Waste-Prohibition-Based Lockean Fair Use
1. Nonviolation of the Waste Prohibition in Markets of
Tangible Goods
In a market for a tangible good, the laborer can limit the number of
units of a specific good produced and can set the price of the units.81
Although the laborers are able to set their prices freely, their choice will be
influenced by the valuation that individual buyers place on the good. The
most common method for analyzing this valuation is the estimation of a
80. This assumption coheres with the self-interested rationality evident throughout Locke's
treatment. See, e.g., LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE, supra note 1, §§ 123-124; see also Moore,
Intangible Property, supra note 17, at 369 (describing laborers as "rational project pursuers" with
a "wide range of value theories"). This weak rationality requirement does not incorporate the
concept of opportunity cost, which would require the laborer not only to produce the optimum
amount of a specific good, but would require the laborer to choose the good that would bring her
the greatest aggregate wealth.
81. There may be certain constraints on the ability of laborers to limit production of tangible
goods. A famous example from literature occurs in The Grapes of Wrath where oranges are
destroyed in order to keep up the price despite the existence of a "million people hungry." JOHN
STEINBECK, THE GRAPES OF WRATH 473-77 (Viking Penguin 1989) (1939).
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demand curve, which is an aggregation of the heterogeneous valuations of a
specific good by the individual potential buyers. A demand curve does not
vary in relation to changes in price but does vary for different goods.
82
First, consider a laborer who is a price taker. As a price taker, such a
laborer may continue to produce goods without considering whether he will
violate the waste prohibition. So long as the laborer sells his goods at or
below the market price, all the goods will be sold, resulting in total money
substitution and no loss of property rights. Within these limits, a laborer
acting in his self-interest will continue to produce units until the marginal
cost of producing the last unit equals the market price and will set a price
equal to, rather than below, the market price.
Second, consider a monopolist laborer. By limiting the number of
goods produced, the laborer can charge a higher price and obtain the
monopoly rent. Although monopolies are inefficient from a social-
economic perspective, they do not violate the Lockean waste prohibition. In
common economic analysis, the economic loss associated with
monopolistic pricing is called a deadweight loss. As an opportunity cost,
this is a real economic loss; however, Locke's waste prohibition does not
apply directly to all opportunity costs. For example, one does not violate the
waste prohibition by removing too little out of the common. Additionally,
no punishment can be justified under Locke's theory if one chooses to
gather apples rather than oranges, even if oranges have a higher tradable
value.
The preceding analysis showed that for all practical purposes the waste
prohibition will never be violated for tangible goods. Although the price at
which the laborer sells the good is dependent on external factors such as the
demand curve and the type of pricing available to the laborer, laborers
acting in their self-interest will have no incentive to produce goods that they
do not sell. Laborers may sell at or below the efficient market price if they
are price takers and may sell at or below the monopoly rent-maximizing
price without violating the waste prohibition.
82. Factors that may cause a shift in the demand curve include a change in the price of
substitutable goods, shifis in tastes, or increased income levels among the potential purchasers.
PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 38-42 (15th ed. 1995) (describing
demand curve basics). The creation of a robust Lockean fair use right may shift the demand curve
downward because a downward move in the price of a substitutable good will create a downward
shift in the demand of the original good, and the creation of a vibrant fair use right adds a set of
intangible goods that the user can get for free. The magnitude of this shift will depend on the
substitutability of the intangible goods, which depends on a variety of factors. On the other hand,
some intangible goods might actually become more valuable as the set of goods available to an
individual increases. See Benkler, supra note 57, at 415-23 (demonstrating that there are
increasing returns to scale when the set of available informational resources is increased). This
downward shift may influence the profitability of any single intangible good but will not eliminate
the existence of low-value users and uses.
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2. A Lockean Fair Use in Markets of Intangible Goods
Recent technological changes have facilitated the ability to imagine a
market for an intangible good rather than a market for a tangible
embodiment of an intangible good. A paradigm example of a money-based
transfer of a tangible embodiment of an intangible good is the purchase of a
CD, which includes the purchase of both an intangible unit and a
corresponding tangible embodiment. A market for an intangible good,
however, would involve trade of only the intangible good. On the Internet,
one no longer needs to purchase a CD in order to purchase a song, but a
buyer and seller each connected to the Internet can transmit "pure thought
or something very much like thought.""3 Even though individual copies-
tangible embodiments-are being traded on the Internet, the conceptual
jump to a true market for intangible goods is smaller than it has historically
been.
Another important implication of recent technological changes is the
decreasing marginal cost of creation and transmission of such goods. The
marginal cost of producing an intangible unit is zero, whereas the marginal
cost of producing a tangible copy embodied in a CD is some positive
amount. 84 The marginal cost of producing an intangible unit is zero because
an inherent quality of nonrivalrous goods is that a very large number of
intangible units have already been produced. Returning to the Internet
example, if the buyer and seller each have access to the Internet, the
marginal cost of producing a copy-a tangible embodiment-of the song
also approaches zero. Neglecting costs associated with transaction costs,
such as collecting payment, a seller incurs virtually no additional cost
whether a single person or a million people copy the music.
Applying Locke's waste prohibition to intangible units also makes
changes to baseline framework considerations. First, the determination of
how many units must be sold in order to achieve total money substitution is
altered. For tangible goods, one must use or sell all units of the good. For
intangible goods, there are as many intangible units as there are potential
83. Barlow, supra note 45.
84. Mark Lemley and David McGowan explain:
The "marginal cost" of a new copy of Microsoft Windows is the cost of the disk (a few
cents), the labor required to copy it (essentially none), and the cost of the manuals,
packaging, and distribution of the box itself to consumers (by far the largest portion).
Software distributed on the Internet has essentially no marginal cost, as it can be
downloaded by consumers on their own time, albeit with some commitment of
computer resources by the supplier.
Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86 CAL.
L. REv. 479, 595 n.484 (1998) (emphasis added); see also Robert M. Weiss & Ajay K. Mehrotra,
Online Dynamic Pricing: Efficiency, Equity and the Future of E-Commerce, 6 VA. J.L. & TECH.
11, T 17 (Summer 2001), at http://www.vjolt.net/vol6/issue2/v6i2-all-Weiss.html (finding that the
"digital economy is filled with numerous firms defined by a structure of high fixed costs and low
marginal costs").
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users, but only a portion of those users will place a nonnegative value on
the intangible unit. Although waste occurs whenever an intangible unit is
not put to any use, the waste prohibition is enforced by individuals in the
state of nature, and no individual who values the good at less than zero will
exert effort to obtain a copy. If a property right is defined as the ability to
exclude and one is able to exclude all persons who would potentially want
to purchase or use the good, then, effectively, no property rights have been
lost. Therefore, total money substitution for intangible goods is best defined
as all nonnegative demand being fulfilled. Second, a laborer in intangible
goods may still choose the price at which to sell, but a laborer cannot limit
the number of units of an intangible good that he produces. This is unlike a
laborer in tangible goods, who can control whether he makes five cars or
ten thousand.
Again consider a price-taking laborer, this time in a market for an
intangible good. A laborer's inability to influence the price is primarily due
to competition in the market. Competition occurs in a market for a distinct
intangible good if a number of people are selling the same good."'
Competition is more likely to result if the intangible good is not relatively
unique-that is, others are easily able to independently produce the good.
Assuming negligible transaction costs, as may be achievable on the
Internet, the price set in a competitive market for an intangible good will be
zero86 because the marginal cost of producing an additional unit of the
nonrivalrous good is zero. Therefore, a competitive market for an intangible
good destroys the laborer's profitability. This ex post destruction of
profitability also removes the ex ante incentive to produce the good when
viewed from a dynamic perspective.
87
If the intangible good is relatively unique-difficult to independently
produce-the laborer might be able to act as a monopolist. If the laborer
can act as a monopolist and set a positive price, she may be able to garner
85. While not defined as competition, the demand curve, and therefore the price of the good,
will also be influenced by the existence of substitutable goods in other markets. See supra note 82.
86. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention,
in NAT'L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH, THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY:
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609, 614-15 (1962).
87. The argument generally proceeds in the following manner. Unless some kind of a
"monopoly" can be obtained for the intangible good, the good will not be ex post profitable to the
laborer. If the laborer does not anticipate ex post rewards, then she will not devote the ex ante
effort to produce it. Therefore, the intangible good will not be produced in the first instance.
One way in which this problem might be partially solved is to consider competition
gradually increasing over time. For example, a laborer might initially be able to demand a
monopoly price, which will be dissipated over time as additional market entrants force the price to
zero. In such a case, the initial sale of the good will generate money substitution in some finite
portion of the units of the intangible good, which may be sufficient to create the necessary ex ante
incentive to produce. As time goes on, competition will increase until the market price reachcs a
level at which it is no longer profitable for the laborer to trade in the good.
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
1200 [Vol. 112: 1179
Limiting Locke
profits from the venture.88 However, the establishment of a monopoly price
excludes those persons who value the intangible good at above the marginal
cost of production but below the price set by the laborer. Such a person will
be called a "low-value user" in this Note. As the intangible units have
already been produced, the choice to refuse to sell units of the intangible
good violates the waste prohibition and results in the loss of property rights
in those specific units. This violation can be enforced by the corresponding
low-value users.8 9 The quantity of this loss coincides with the amount of the
deadweight loss described in the previous Section, although unfulfilled
demand for intangible goods is more than a mere opportunity cost because
the intangible units have already been produced.
The application of these ideal-type pricing mechanisms to intangible
goods demonstrates that the goal of a self-interested laborer is not to obtain
total market substitution, even at the cost of a loss of property rights in a
portion of the units of the intangible good. In fact, in order to gain any
revenue in a single-price market, the laborer must violate the waste
prohibition. The problems generally associated with monopolies may even
be more acute for intangible goods because the loss associated with
monopolistic behavior may be higher for intangible goods.90
The result of the laborer's decision not to set the price at zero in order
to effectuate total market substitution, reasonable though it may be, creates
a fair use right. All those persons who value the good above zero but below
the laborer's price can justifiably copy the good without reimbursing the
laborer, although these low-value users must make the copy at their own
cost, not the cost of the laborer. 91 Just as the laborer's actions in producing
88. In fact, a cost of copying equal to zero suggests that a monopolist might be able to garner
significant profits from the sale of an intangible good,
89. Potential purchasers-those who value the good at above the monopoly price-would
violate the taking prohibition if they made an illicit copy because they would impose a harm on
the laborer: the lost profits. However, taking by low-value users cannot violate the taking
prohibition because the laborer will lose no profits from the sale.
90. See Yochai Benkler, An Unhurried View of Private Ordering in Information
Transactions, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2063, 2066-69 (2000) (citing factors such as high uncertainty,
positive externalities, and budget constraints that increase deadweight losses and are often
pronounced for intangible goods).
91. The fair use right in turn may influence the ability to determine true valuation because it
allows an individual to gain access to the good without actually revealing the level at which the
individual values the good. Although economists might be able to predict reasonably accurate
demand curves, even where demand has not been explicitly revealed, this aggregate information
will not be helpful in determining which specific individuals are low-value users on a case-by-
case basis. An underlying concern here is that individuals will then have an incentive to disguise
their true valuation. Although this type of system gaming can be cabined into an enforceability
concern and saved for Part Ill, the concern may be more problematic than mere enforceability
because an individual's true valuation might not be knowable except as a revealed preference. If
one has the alternative of either paying a price for a good or getting the good for free (through the
fair use right), one will "reveal" the fact that one prefers free use. In other words, it may not be
that individuals will lie in bad faith about their valuation, but that they will be unable to determine
their actual valuation of the intangible good without having to choose between alternatives.
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the good create a moral, natural-law-based property right in the good, the
laborer's pricing actions may create a moral, natural-law-based fair use
right in others. Gordon's conclusion that "[a]voiding 'deadweight loss' is a
natural right only if the public has a right to free copying" and that the
public "has no such right"92 is incorrect. First, a laborer has no right to
exclude individuals from unused or unsold intangible units because she has
no property right in such goods. Therefore, a focus on the public's right
may be deceiving because the laborer herself does not have a property right
in those intangible units. Second, even if the public as a whole does not
have a right to free copying, some individuals within the public, the low-
value users, will have a right to enforce the waste prohibition against the
property owner.
3. Nonmarketed Intangible Goods and Nonmarketed Uses of
Intangible Goods
Some intangible goods do not directly fit the market model of the
preceding Subsection. First, consider intangible goods that are indirectly,
not directly, valuable to the laborer. These "enabling intangible goods" are
valuable for the way that they enable the production of other goods,
intangible or not. A Lockean example of such a good in the waste
prohibition context is land harvested for fruit.93 Other examples of such
goods include a chemical process that creates a tangible chemical product, a
compression technology used to store a tangible embodiment of intangible
digital photographs, and an intangible cast of characters used in a movie
sequel. In order to determine the scope of a waste prohibition violation in
relation to these enabling intangible goods, one should look at whether the
end product is being wasted. If the laborer has a monopoly in the end
product, then the waste prohibition will be violated for the underlying
enabling good. One reason that these enabling goods might be used to
develop monopolies rather than licensing the use of the enabling goods to
other producers was described by Kenneth Arrow, who argued that
Solutions to these two problems are likely to take the form of the methods of price
discrimination described in Section I.B. For example, one might develop a postpurchase
objective test that measures the amount of time and attention that one devotes to the good, such as
how often one listens to the CD. Violations of privacy, however, may prohibit the ability and
desirability of using this type of postpurchase value determination. See Julie E. Cohen, A Right To
Read Anonymously: A Closer Look at "Copyright Management" in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L.
REv. 981 (1996).
92. Gordon, supra note 16, at 1549. Others who have argued against a Lockean fair use right
have also largely ignored the waste prohibition. See, e.g., Lacey, supra note 17, at 1564 (asserting
that the fair use doctrine is "totally unjustifiable" because of the "absolutist proposition" required
by Lockean property rights, without, however, considering the waste prohibition); Moore,
Lockean Theory, supra note 17, at 98 (arguing, without citing the waste prohibition, that there
"should be no mandatory government legislated policy of fair use").
93. LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE, supra note 1, § 38.
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
1202 [Vol. 112: 1179
2003] Limiting Locke 1203
information will not be purchased until it is known, but if it is known, it
cannot be sold.94 In other words, it may be that some intangible goods
cannot be effectively sold in a market. As compared to directly copying the
intangible good, enforcement of the waste prohibition for enabling
intangible goods will be accomplished through what is commonly called
reverse engineering. In other words, a user will examine the end product in
an attempt to determine the process by which it was developed-that is, the
underlying enabling intangible good.
Second, there will be specific intangible goods or specific uses of
intangible goods95 that are not valuable enough to make trading in the good
worthwhile, either in a market or through direct contracting. 96 As the good
or use of the good is not marketed at all, the user would maintain a full fair
use right to enforce the waste prohibition. A common example of an
intangible good for which there is not likely to be enough aggregate
demand to justify negotiating between laborers and users is an out-of-print
book. Analogously, there will also be certain uses for which there is such
little aggregate demand that negotiation costs would actually be greater than
the value of the use. These will be called "low-value uses" in this Note. An
example of a low-value use might be the use of a poster as part of the
background in a theatrical set.
97
B. Perfect Price Discrimination as a Means of Eliminating Fair Use
A laborer may be able to limit the scope of the fair use right through
price discrimination. Price discrimination occurs when the seller charges
"different prices to buyers when the price difference cannot be explained by
a cost difference in supplying" the good.98 Although the social and
economic merits of price discrimination for intangible goods are
contested, 99 there are definite implications for the Lockean waste
94. Arrow, supra note 86, at 609, 614-16.
95. Property rights to use intangible goods in specific ways can be individually marketed. A
laborer may market the ability to use an intangible good in one way at a certain price and another
way at a different price. For example, the owner of a Broadway musical might sell the rights to
listen to the music on a CD for a relatively small amount and sell the rights to perform the musical
for a relatively large amount.
96. Although the impetus is on the laborer to offer the good for sale in order to avoid
violating the waste prohibition, a user who values the good at a high enough level to offset
negotiation costs may be under a duty to self-identify as a potential purchaser of a relatively low-
value use.
97. But cf Ringgold v. Black Entm't Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding
that the use of a poster of a quilt as set decoration on a television program did not qualify as fair
use).
98. Michael J. Meurer, Copyright Law and Price Discrimination, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 55,
58 (2001). For a detailed analysis of price discrimination, see JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 133 -68 (1988).
99. Compare Meurer, supra note 98, at 90-102 (describing distributional and allocative
efficiency problems with price discrimination), with William W. Fisher I, Property and Contract
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prohibition. Perfect price discrimination is defined as the case where the
seller sets an individual price for each buyer that is equal to the buyer's
valuation of the good. In this situation, each buyer who values the good at a
positive amount will purchase the good, resulting in total money
substitution, no violation of the waste prohibition, and no free use by
individuals (except perhaps those individuals who value the good at exactly
zero).100 Yochai Benkler argues, however, that in practice all price
discrimination will be "lumpy."' 1 Imperfect price discrimination, where
some but not all of the demand is satisfied, may lower the amount of the
waste-prohibition violation but does not eliminate it entirely.
In order to price-discriminate, a seller must be able to link different
prices to buyers with different valuations.10 2 Economists have classified
methodologies into three categories: first-, second-, and third-degree price
discrimination.10 3 First-degree price discrimination is the ideal case where
the value of the buyer is known without effort-i.e., under the assumption
of perfect information. First-degree price discrimination is also equated
with perfect price discrimination. 1
04
Second- and third-degree price discrimination correlate objective
factors with a buyer's valuation and therefore result in imperfect price
discrimination. Second-degree price discrimination uses product
differentiation to sort users with different valuations. Three objective
product distinctions are common when performing second-degree price
discrimination: time, quantity, and quality. A seller who releases an initial
high-cost version of a good, such as the sale of CDs in a music store,
followed by subsequent low-cost distribution, such as the sale of CDs in a
music club, uses time to accomplish second-degree price discrimination. A
seller who controls the number of times a user may use the good, such as
admission to a movie, accomplishes second-degree price discrimination
through quantity. Finally, a seller might also offer lower-quality goods to
users who value the good less.
Third-degree price discrimination employs objective buyer
characteristics to differentiate potential valuation. Characteristics of
on the Internet, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1203, 1234-40 (1998) (claiming distributional and
allocative efficiency gains from price discrimination).
100. Although under perfect price discrimination the seller gets to appropriate all of the
surplus, an alternate pricing scheme could achieve total money substitution. Consider an example
with three potential buyers: A values the good at V,, B values the good at Vb, and C values the
good at V,. Assume that the marginal cost of production is the same for these three goods and is
equal to c. If p, is the price of the good offered to each user, total money substitution will result so
long as c <p < V , C <Pb < Vh, and c <p, < V,, whereas perfect price discrimination demands that
p. = V., pb = Vb, and P. = V .
101. Benkler, supra note 90, at 2072.
102. Other requirements include the existence of market power and the ability to prevent
arbitrage. Meurer, supra note 98, at 59.
103. See TIROLE, supra note 98, at 135; Meurer, supra note 98, at 67-75.
104. TIROLE, supra note 98, at 135.
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individuals or entities that might be relevant in determining their valuation
include socioeconomic status, which is likely to correlate roughly with the
ability to pay for goods and may itself also be correlated to other objective
factors such as student or senior status. The type of use might also indicate
differences in valuation, such as differential pricing for commercial, as
compared to personal, use of software packages. Additionally, differential
valuation may be correlated to some extent with geographical boundaries.
A Lockean waste prohibition perspective on price discrimination yields
two results. First, it suggests an inversion of the common relationship
between price discrimination and user rights. Michael Meurer argues that
the "relationship between [user] rights and price discrimination is simple-
broad user rights impede price discrimination."' 0 5 Under a Lockean
analysis, however, it is the choice or the inability to obtain perfect price
discrimination that creates the fair use right in the first instance. Second,
although first-degree price discrimination will completely fulfill the
requirements of the waste prohibition, second- and third-degree price
discrimination violate the waste prohibition to some extent due to their
lumpiness. Some methods of price discrimination, especially second-degree
price discrimination, also violate the waste prohibition to a greater degree.
If price discrimination is accomplished through marketing an inferior good,
the waste prohibition has been violated as to the difference in quality
between the two goods in addition to the violations pertaining to low-value
uses and users.
C. Culture as a Basis for a Lockean Fair Use Right
This Section will consider culture as an alternative means of justifying
a Lockean fair use right. Lockean theorists, most notably Wendy Gordon,
have argued for a Lockean right to cultural fair use. 0 6 Gordon emphasizes
access to a common of intangible goods and the public domain as well as
compliance with the strong sufficiency proviso." 7 First, she argues that
restricted access to those developed intangible goods that are part of the
society's culture constitutes a harm because culture is a part of the Lockean
105. Meurer, supra note 98, at 61.
106. A postnodern Lockean argument for a right to cultural fair use identifies the public as a
collective identity that participates in the authorship of intangible goods, Steven Wilf, Who
Authors Trademarks?, 17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 6-10 (1999). But see Waldron, supra
note 6, at 862 (claiming that natural law theory focuses on individuals). In a discussion of
trademarks, Steven Wilf emphasizes the dynamic communication between the public and the
trademark owner. In order for the trademark to be owned, it must have acquired secondary
meaning, defined as recognition by the public. Wilf, supra, at 32-36. Therefore, Wilf argues that
because the public participates in authoring the trademark, it should be granted a partial natural
law property right in the good as a coauthor. Id. at 1-6.
107. Gordon, supra note 16, at 1563 ("The proviso ... lies at the center of this Article's
thesis.").
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common. °8 As explained earlier, Gordon's argument fails, however,
because she conflates the Lockean common of intangible goods, which is
limited to undeveloped intangible goods, with culture, which is composed
of developed intangible goods. 0 9 Second, Gordon argues that a person who
independently produces an intangible good may harm another by making
that person's holdings less valuable."l 0 Given the existence of the
independent production right and Locke's explicit allowance for great
disparities in talent and wealth, this type of relativistic no harm principle
does not cohere with Locke's theory."'
A cultural fair use right may be analyzed more appropriately through
Locke's removal requirement and by consulting the independent production
principle in a different way than Gordon. Locke requires that the laborer
remove the good from the common in order to exclude others.1 12 Removal
of tangible goods in an abundant common consists of (1) physically
separating a rivalrous good out of the common and (2) using methods of
exclusion to maintain separation. Although physical removal is impossible
for intangible goods, one can exclude others by controlling access through
secrecy. 113 Finally, the exclusion must be maintained, which can be
accomplished, for example, through agreements for postpurchase
nondisclosure.' 14 Loss of exclusivity may involve several stages, whereby
the intangible good progressively becomes less and less secret.' 1 5
108. Id. at 1559, 1562-63, 1593.
109. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
110. Gordon, supra note 16, at 1567-68; see also Waldron, supra note 6, at 876-82 (arguing
that because "we constantly compare ourselves to others," a relative difference in wealth may
cause emotional harm).
111. See Sterk, supra note 17, at 1234 (describing Lockean theory as an "equality of
opportunity theory" rather than a theory of relative equality). A relativistic notion that Locke does
use is a comparison between individuals in the state of nature and under civil government. See
LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE, supra note 1, § 137,
112. LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE, supra note 1, § 27. Emphasizing the removal requirements,
Robert Bone concludes that natural rights theory is a "formalistic theory of property rights that
equates property with factual exclusivity." Robert G. Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret Law:
Doctrine in Search ofJustification, 86 CAL. L. REV. 241, 304 (1998),
113. See Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, Are Ideas Within the Traditional Definition of
Property?: A Jurisprudential Analysis, 47 ARK. L. REV. 603, 627-31 (1994) ("The requirement
that a trade secret must not be generally known is merely another way of determining whether the
trade secret owner has possession of the know-how comprising the trade secret."); Bone, supra
note 112, at 252-58 (describing the emergence of trade secret law in the United States under a
natural rights theory that follows generally the structure outlined in this Note).
Hughes mischaracterizes the process of removal. He implicitly asserts that removal of an
idea or fact also removes the ability to independently produce it. See Hughes, supra note 15, at
314. Controlling access to the intangible good through secrecy does not allow others to
appropriate it immediately, but it also does not keep others from independently discovering the
same idea.
114. See generally Steven Cherensky, Comment, A Penny for Their Thoughts. Employee-
Inventors, Preinvention Assignment Agreements, Propery, and Personhood, 81 CAL. L. REV. 595
(1993) (discussing the importance of such nondisclosure agreements).
115. But see Schaffner, supra note 17, at 1127 (claiming that Lockean theory is limited to
property exclusive against the world or to a common exclusionary against no one).
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Alternatively, one can view the secrecy requirement through the lens of
the independent production principle. For an easily communicated
intangible good, merely showing the good may be enough to transfer the
good, as "some inventions 'infect' one immediately with knowledge of
their workings."'"1 6 One result of such an immediate infection is that the
person would not subsequently be able to independently produce the idea.
As the independent production right is a requirement of Lockean theory, a
laborer must not reveal an intangible good before a purchase agreement has
been made or else he loses his property rights in that good.
Property rights in widely disseminated cultural goods are not tenable
under Lockean theory because elements of a culture cannot be kept secret.
For example, the right to describe one's surroundings, an example used by
Gordon, would fit into this category. 1 7 As advocated by Jeremy Waldron,
where a privately held intangible good is "thrust out into the cultural world
to impinge on the consciousness of all of us," the owner could be seen as
having abandoned the good into the public domain rather than having
removed it from the common.
18
The removal requirement also highlights an important tension in the
state of nature. Labor mixing provides a right for laborers to exclude others
from the good. This exclusion can be enforced by what Locke calls an
"Inclosure"1 19 -analogous to a wall or fence for tangible goods-instead of
merely relying on others to obey the natural law. The waste prohibition,
however, allows a rightful user to break through this enclosure in order to
get at the wasting goods. 120 The tension lies in determining the appropriate
strength of the enclosure. At one extreme, the owner's creation of an
impermeable enclosure eliminates the ability to enforce a violation of the
waste prohibition. At the other extreme, a fair user who decimates the
owner's enclosure such that anyone can steal as much of the good as he
wants can be seen as contributorily violating the owner's property right in
the good. Although the principles of the state of nature do not provide a
clear way to resolve this tension, this tension should be reexamined in light
of Part III, where the government as a single entity can internally balance
the competing interests.
116. Gordon, supra note 16, at 1582; see also Reese, supra note 17, at 720-23 (arguing that
known inventions lessen the chance for actual independent production).
117. See Gordon, supra note 16, at 1556-58.
118. Waldron, supra note 6, at 883 (analogizing to the doctrine of trademarks becoming
generic).
119. LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE, supra note 1, § 38.
120. See id.
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III. LOCKEAN FAIR USE UNDER A CIVIL GOVERNMENT
This Part addresses the societal transition to a civil government. Locke
argues that the principle of majority consent largely replaces individual
consent under a civil government. The shift to majority consent has
important implications for the potential scope of the private property right
under a civil government. Of the three independent principles that bind
action in the state of nature, I argue in this Part that only the waste
prohibition continues to bind a civil government. The state, therefore, takes
over the duty to police violations of the waste prohibition, which it may
accomplish in alternative ways that are not available in the state of nature,
such as establishing a public domain.
This Part also compares a Lockean regime to current U.S. intellectual
property theory and doctrine. The functional application of copyright fair
use is similar in that fair use is an all-or-nothing privilege that inheres in
individuals in both the Lockean regime and under U.S. copyright law.
Differences are also demonstrated, including the absence of a patent fair use
doctrine and a more limited scope of fair use under current U.S. copyright
doctrines than would be provided under a Lockean regime. Finally, the
moral implications of wasted intangible goods are considered in the drug
patent context.
A. The Transition to Civil Government
Locke devotes a vast majority of the Second Treatise to a discussion of
civil government.' Locke begins by claiming that expediency drives
people together into civil governments' 2 and that the consent of these
people legitimates the governments. 123 Upon entering a civil government,
they subject themselves to supreme power in the legislature, 124 which
retains this power until individual members decide to leave the society or
the government acts outside the bounds of its authority and the people as a
whole revolt.1
25
Locke provided a number of principles to guide the legislature in
pursuing lawmaking authorized by the natural law. The first set of
requirements deals with the rulemaking power. Rules must be general,
121. The discussion of the transition into civil government constitutes the bulk of chapters 7-
19, as compared to the discussion of property, which is limited to chapter 5.
122. LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE, supra note 1, § 127.
123. Id. §§ 15, 22.
124. Id. §§ 149-150.
125. Compare id. §§ 149, 243 (explaining that supreme power is in the legislature), with id.
§§ 211-221 (describing which actions by the government justify revolt and dissolution of the
common government).
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known by the community, and made by the legislative power. 126 The second
set of requirements deals with the scope of the rulemaking power. The
scope of the law is limited in that the law cannot contain more power than
the parties had to give in the state of nature, 127 cannot take property without
majority consent, 28 cannot harm the society, 129 and cannot constrain a
person's freedom to act as she wishes in the absence of a prescribed rule.13
0
As the legislature remains bound by the natural law, 31 the major
difference relating to trade in the state of nature and under civil government
is the aggregation of consent. In the state of nature, consent is given from
individual to individual, whereas under civil government, consent is given
from the individual to the state, which may then act and compel individuals
to act under a theory of majority consent. Although semantically the right to
exclude remains-nobody "hath a right to take their substance, or any part
of it from them, without their own consent" 132-a civil government may act
in a wide variety of ways that may limit the right to exclude because
consent is redefined as majority consent[33 acting "only for the Publick
Good."
, 134
Locke lists three reasons why groups of individuals transition from a
state of nature into a civil government: a scarce common, 35 enhancement of
the public good, 136 and, most importantly, enforcement of property rights.1
3 7
In order to enforce a property right, one must be able to exclude and choose
126. Id. § 3.
127. Id. § 135.
128. Id. § 138.
129. Id. § 166.
130. See id. §§ 128-129.
131. Id. § 135 (declaring that the "Law of Nature stands as an Eternal Rule to all Men,
Legislators as well as others").
132. Id. § 138.
133. Id. § 140. Despite the tension between individual and majority consent, Locke strongly
asserts the need to submit to majority consent. He argues that "[w]hen any number of Men have
so consented to make one Community or Government,... the Majority have a Right to act and
conclude the rest." !d. § 95. This right is required because "that which acts any Community, being
only thc consent of the individuals of it, and it being necessary to that which is one body to move
one way; it is necessary the Body should move that way whither the greater force cames it, which
is the consent of the majority." Id. § 96. If the right is not recognized, Locke argues, "where the
majority cannot conclude the rest, there they cannot act as one Body, and consequently will be
immediately dissolved again." Id. § 98.
134. Id. § 3; see also id. §§ 88, 96, 140. The legislature is bound to act in the people's
interest, in addition to acting within the confines of the natural law, because the members would
not have entered into, or remain in, a society where they were going to be harmed. See id. §§ 137,
166.
135. Id. § 45 (claiming that when people obtain more goods through the use of a money
system, the land becomes scarce and the people organize themselves together). This reason is
unimportant when considering the nonrivalrous common of intangible goods.
136. Id. § 3.
137. See, e.g., id. § 124 ("The great and chief end.., is the Preservation of their Property.").
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to exclude others.1 38 Exclusion is protected by a natural right to punish a
party who violates the natural law, 139 whether the violation occurs through
ignorance of or ignoring the natural law. 140 The practical difficulties
associated with enforcing one's own property rights against others do not
confound the natural law but merely suggest a reason why men typically
move out of the state of nature and into a civil government.1
41
The problem of maintaining exclusion is more pronounced for
intangible goods, and thus the incentives for transitioning into a civil
government are also more pronounced for owners of intangible goods.
Many definitions of intangible goods qualify them as public goods, namely
that they are nonrivalrous and that they are physically nonexcludable.
142
Hughes argues that intangible goods are nonexcludable in part because a
person cannot be prevented from privately using an idea.143 Even if
exclusion can initially be maintained, the framework must also prevent
arbitrage from the persons who obtain a fair use right or who pay a lower
price to those who are obligated to pay a higher rate.144 Exclusion can be
enforced through technical means, such as digital-rights-management
provisions, or through legal means, such as statutes like the No Electronic
Theft Act, which imposes criminal sanctions for large-scale violations of
intellectual property rights.145 In addition to establishing an impartial
arbiter, a civil government may also be able to establish clear categories of
138. For example, Locke defines property as that which cannot be taken from a man without
his consent. Id. § 193; see also WALDRON, supra note 17, at 158-60 (arguing that Locke maintains
a clear distinction throughout the Second Treatise between "property in" items and items that are
the "property of' a person, with the second allowing for exclusion).
139. Compare LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE, supra note 1, §§ 7-11 (allowing for full restitution
and preventing offenses), with id. § 126 (explaining that men will often lack the power to enforce
their own property rights).
140. See id. § 124.
141. See id. §§ 13, 123-127.
142. See, e.g., Lacey, supra note 17, at 1553-55. Mechanisms are evolving, however, for the
protection of intangible goods, such as encryption and password requirements that may allow
greater enforceability than that which exists for tangible goods. Benkler, supra note 90, at 2065.
143. Hughes, supra note 15, at 315-16 (arguing that "thought-police" would be required to
make intangible goods fully excludable, but that these thought-police are technologically
infeasible and would violate privacy rights); see also Moore, Intangible Property, supra note 17,
at 371-75 (discussing privacy considerations).
144. The arbitrage problem is likely to be less pronounced for low-value uses due to the lack
of any market in which to conduct the arbitrage. See Maureen A. O'Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of
Fair Use in Patent Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1177, 1188-89 (2000).
145. No Electronic Theft (NET) Act, Pub. L. No. 105-147, 111 Stat. 2678 (1997) (codified as
amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-803 (Supp. IV 1998) and at 18 U.S.C. § 2319 (2000)); see also
Karen J. Bernstein, The No Electronic Theft Act: The Music Industry's New Instrument in the
Fight Against Internet Piracy, 7 UCLA ENT. L. REv. 325 (2000) (discussing in detail the
evolution of the willful infringement requirement under the statute).
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individuals or uses that may act as proxies for permissible and
impermissible intrusions on property rights. 146
B. The Existence and Scope of the Fair Use Right
If society has transitioned out of the state of nature and into a
government, 47 what can Lockean theories of civil government teach us
about the intricacies of intellectual property theory? That a government
should act "for the publick good," or even "only for the publick good,"' 148 is
a tautology so thin that it provides little to no help in determining the actual
scope of intellectual property rights. This deflating question may lead to
problematic conclusions. Gordon's Lockean theory of intellectual property
is incorrect because she does not carefully distinguish limitations and
opportunities that are different between the state of nature and a civil
government.1 49 Other, more cynical arguments suggest that Locke was
mostly unconcerned with his natural rights theory of property, and thus his
deontological justifications for property should be ignored. 50
As described earlier,15 1 Lockean theory contains three independent
principles from the state of nature that could potentially continue to limit
property rights in a civil government: the independent production principle,
the no harm prohibition, and the waste prohibition. The independent
production principle is intimately tied to individual consent. Even though
autonomy cannot be alienated fully,15 2 individual consent in the state of
nature can largely be replaced by majority consent in a civil government.
146. Governmental regulation may take the form of traditional laws--"East Coast Code"-or
technical requirements, such as those embedded into the architecture of the Intemet-"West Coast
Code." LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 53-54 (1999).
147. The question of whether the interactions of nation-states constitute a state of nature, or
whether, through treaty or custom, the state of nature no longer exists is beyond the scope of this
Note.
148. LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE, supra note 1, § 3.
149. See Friedman, supra note 17, at 165 ("Gordon focuses on Locke's deontological state-
of-nature theory without considering that Locke liquidates natural property rights when civil
society is founded."). Gordon bases her ability to impose the scope of property developed in the
state of nature to a civil government on Locke's claim that the natural law must be fulfilled at all
times. Gordon, supra note 16, at 1554-55. Gordon argues that other than rights of enforcement,
the "individual retains virtually all the other rights and duties of the law of nature in civil society."
Id. As described previously, a vital problem with Gordon's argument is that it conflates the public
domain and the Lockean common.
Wilf does not conflate the two societal systems, arguing that different property rules are
obtained in the state of nature and under civil government. Wilf, supra note 106, at 31-32
(concluding that no intellectual property is cognizable under the state of nature).
150. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 17, at 164 ("Locke's property theory is a digression
made necessary only to challenge the absolutist politics advanced by Filmer. Hence it should not
surprise us that Locke is willing to undo private property rights once they have served his
polemical purpose .... ").
151. See supra notes 22-29 and accompanying text.
152. See LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE, supra note 1, § 23 (arguing that natural law forbids a
man, even by consent, to enslave himself).
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This alienability suggests that the independent production principle and the
Lockean fair use right to culture are largely inapplicable under a civil
government. The no harm principle is also largely alienable under majority
consent in a civil government. Therefore, Locke can argue that legislative
actions that impose benefits on some individuals and harms on other
individuals are legitimate because the individual harmed by one statute is
benefited by other statutes, such that the overall effect on the individual is a
benefit.153 So long as the government generally acts in a way that benefits
society as a whole, the no harm principle is not violated.
The consent given from the governed to a civil government does not,
however, affect the applicability of the waste prohibition. In other words, a
private action or governmental regulation that violates the waste prohibition
in the state of nature will still violate the natural law under a civil
government and is null under Lockean theory.' 54 As an owner does not have
a right to violate the waste prohibition in the state of nature, his consent
cannot justify such a violation under a civil government. Even consent by
those who enforce the waste prohibition in the state of nature cannot
alienate this right under a civil government. In the state of nature,
individuals enforced the waste prohibition by taking the spoiling good, but
under a civil government, the government itself enforces the natural law.'55
This suggests that the state has a duty to determine what constitutes a
violation of the waste prohibition and "punish" such violations.
In addition to increasing enforceability of property rights in intangible
goods, a transition to civil government opens up opportunities for
alternative ways of avoiding a violation of the waste prohibition. An
important implication is that a government could use its power of majority
consent to establish a public domain-a set of developed intangible goods
that are available freely to all potential users. There are a number of ways in
which the government could establish a public domain, including the
current U.S. system whereby the government provides enforcement of
intellectual property rights in exchange for the mandatory donation of the
intangible good to the public domain after a set period of time. Recently, a
number of alternate proposals for establishing more universal access to
intangible goods using government-provided prizes have been offered.
153. This argument can be pieced together from the following. First, Locke claims that unless
we allow the consent of the majority to bind all individuals in civil government, the "variety of
Opinions, and contrariety of Intcrests" will limit the ability of the government to survive. Id.
§ § 95-99. Second, Locke requires that a civil government must provide enough benefits to propel
a man to "quit the freedom of the state of Nature." Id. § 137; see also Moore, Intangible Property,
supra note 17, at 369-71 (discussing the appropriate baseline of comparison).
154. See LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE, supra note 1, § 135.
155. Seeid. §87.
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Although implementing the policies may be difficult,15 6 these proposals can
be used to highlight the different methods available to a civil government in
satisfying the waste prohibition. First, consider an initial proposal that the
government's eminent domain power could be used to "take" the property
rights in an intangible good for just compensation.' 57 The government
would thus use general tax revenue in order to purchase the intangible good
for the free use of society as a whole. This idea was later spun in a
somewhat different fashion, suggesting that it would be more efficient to
provide rights-holders with an option either to keep the intellectual property
rights or to sell the government the rights to the good for an amount that
can be determined either ex ante, as with the initial proposal, or could be
determined ex post by correlating sales incorporating the intangible good to
a prize function. 158 Finally, one might use the government funds to facilitate
purchases by low-value users, providing subsidies to facilitate purchase at
the prevailing market price.159
C. Application to U.S. Intellectual Property Theory and Doctrine
1. Copyright Fair Use and the DMCA
The fair use doctrine in U.S. copyright law is similar in function and
economic justification to the Lockean fair use right developed in this Note.
A copyright is obtained in "original works of authorship fixed in any
tangible medium of expression"'16) and provides broad-reaching property
rights to copyright holders, including the ability to exclude others from
copying the work, distributing copies, or performing the work publicly. 16'
Under copyright law, the property rights are enforceable through
preliminary and permanent injunctions, as well as through statutory and
actual damages.'1
62
The functional application of the fair use doctrine in copyright law
mirrors Lockean principles. The scope of an owner's copyright is limited by
156. For an excellent overview and critique of existing patent prize proposals, see Michael
Abramowicz, Perfecting Patent Prizes, 56 VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming 2003).
157. Robert C. Guell & Marvin Fischbaum, Toward Allocative Efficiency in the Prescription
Drug Industry, 73 MILBANK Q. 213 (1995).
158. Steven Shavell & Tanguy van Ypersele, Rewards Versus Intellectual Property Rights,
44 J.L. & ECON. 525 (2001).
159. See Douglas Gary Lichtman, Pricing Prozac: Why the Government Should Subsidize the
Purchase of Patented Pharmaceuticals, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 123 (1997).
160. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2000). Works that do not exhibit sufficient originality do not get
copyright protection. Id. Examples of these types of works include mere data compilations, Feist
Publ'ns v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991), short phrases and slogans, 37 C.F.R. § 202.1
(2002), and scenes A faire, Williams v. Crichton, 84 F.3d 581 (2d Cir. 1996).
161. 17 U.S.C. § 102.
162. Id. §§ 502-504.
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section 107, which establishes a four-factor test to determine whether a use
is a fair use. 16 3 Fair use is a "privilege in others than the owner of the
copyright to use the copyrighted material in a reasonable manner without
his consent."' The functional result of the fair use privilege is in most
cases an "all-or-nothing choice"' 65 between an injunction against the use or
use without compensation by the infringing party. The application of the
fair use doctrine comports with the Lockean application of the waste
prohibition to monopolist pricing in a single-price market for an intangible
good in two significant ways. First, the ability to transcend the broad
property rights of the owner of the intangible good is centered in specific
individuals rather than in specific intangible goods. The fair use doctrine
allows only some individuals the right to use the copyrighted material for
free, while everyone else must pay a fee. Similarly, the Lockean waste
prohibition grants a right of free use to only some individuals and not to
others. Second, the "all-or-nothing" dichotomy of fair use law mirrors the
Lockean waste prohibition because a violation of the waste prohibition
produces a total loss of property rights-i.e., fair use-in that specific
intangible unit.
Although a variety of justifications for the fair use doctrine exist, such
as promoting First Amendment considerations,166 this Subsection focuses
on the economic element of the theoretical framework for the fair use
doctrine based on potential market failures associated with transaction
costs. 16 7 The framework for economic considerations was established by
163. Id. § 107. The four factors are:
(I) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted
work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work.
Id.
164. Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters, 471 U.S. 539, 549 (1985) (citation
omitted).
165. Wendy I. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of
the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. R-Ev. 1600, 1623 (1982). Some courts have
even suggested that compulsory licensing regimes might be appropriate. Id. at 1623-24 & nn. 127-
28.
166. See, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright's Constitutionality,
112 YALE L.J. 1, 3-5 (2002) (arguing that current copyright doctrine's "insulation from the First
Amendment" should be reconsidered using the "freedom of imagination" as a framework). But
see Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 558-60 (construing First Amendment rights to fair use narrowly).
See generally Zimmerman, supra note 3 (arguing for a greater First Amendment limitation on
copyright law).
167. The parody exception allows users to "conjure up" a copyrighted work in order to
comment or criticize the original. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 588
(1994). Although market-related, the economic justification for parody as a fair use right is
different than the justification I am considering here. This Note largely considers the problem of
transaction costs, whereas the parody exception exists largely because the owner of the property
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Gordon,' 68 has been expanded upon by others, such as Maureen
O'Rourke,' 69 and was important in congressional consideration of the 1976
Copyright Act.' 70 Gordon argues that the fair use doctrine is a judicial
response to market failures, some of which are created by transaction
costs. 171 Working from first principles, Gordon's fair use theory begins with
basic market assumptions including the absence of transaction costs.
Granting a copyright allows the establishment of markets for a wide array
of intangible goods and their uses. 172 Transaction costs may, however, limit
the ability of buyers to engage with sellers who would be willing to
purchase the good at above the marginal cost of production (which
marginal cost is zero in the case of markets for intangible goods). A
complete market failure occurs when there is no exchange of an intangible
good for a specific use-an intangible unit-when there are buyers who
value the good at above the cost of copying. In such a case, fair use by the
potential buyer is a Pareto superior move because the potential buyer is able
to gain utility without diminishing any monetary reward that the seller
could have gained. 1
73
Gordon's theoretical justification for the fair use doctrine largely
coheres with the Lockean description in this Note. The easy case for
comparison is complete market failure, such as the absence of a market for
an out-of-print book. The failure of the market to effectuate socially
efficient uses of out-of-print books by scholars and others has often
motivated courts to provide fair use rights. 74 This is also an easy case for
the Lockean waste prohibition. Due to the waste prohibition, the laborer
cannot maintain property rights in the intangible units of the book that she
does not sell. The complete lack of a market is by its nature a complete
violation of the waste prohibition and consists of a total abrogation of rights
in the intangible good (except as to the single intangible unit used by the
laborer herself).
The Lockean waste prohibition, however, creates a fair use right that is
much more robust than the current fair use doctrine. Although Gordon
includes the market assumption of competition, she then ignores the
has incentives not to license parodies that are not aligned with society's value in obtaining the
parodies. See Gordon, supra note 165, at 1633.
168. Gordon, supra note 165 (arguing that fair use should be allowed where market failures
prevent efficient trading).
169. O'Rourke, supra note 144, at 1177, 1180, 1188-89 (arguing that fair use is socially
desirable in some cases of market failures).
170. Gordon, supra note 165, at 1603.
171. Id. at 1602-14.
172. id. at 1612-13.
173. Id. at 1618-22.
174. See, e.g., Triangle Publ'ns v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, 626 F.2d 1171, 1176 n. 14 (5th
Cir. 1980) ("[l]f the copyrighted work is out of print and cannot be purchased, a user may be more
likely to prevail on a fair use defense.").
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implications of the fundamental nature of granting a copyright on this
assumption. The grant of an intellectual property right in an intangible good
limits competition and is frequently referred to as a monopoly grant that is
acceptable only to the extent that it is necessary to provide ex ante
incentives for intangible good producers. Stated another way, monopoly
pricing above the efficient level is itself a market failure.' 75 When a
monopolist seller establishes a price, she divides the world into three
groups: those who value the good at or above the market price, those who
value the good below the market price but at or above zero, and those who
put a negative value on the good. Due to the nonrivalry of intangible goods
and Locke's waste prohibition, the seller loses the right to exclude all those
who are in the latter two groups under a Lockean regime, but not
necessarily under U.S. copyright law. This suggests that for the U.S.
copyright law to align itself with Lockean principles would require a much
more expansive fair use right.
Lockean analysis also provides an interesting perspective on the
relatively recent anticircumvention measures enacted by the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act,' 76 specifically the provisions codified into
section 1201 of the Copyright Act. 177 These provisions prohibit actions
taken to circumvent access controls or other technological measures that
protect a copyrighted work and provide relief independent of infringement
actions.178 Pamela Samuelson described the potential ramifications of such
a privatized regime this way: "If works are protected against unauthorized
copying by means of technology and contract law, there may be nothing for
copyright to do .... ,179 The government holds a natural law duty both to
protect private property rights and to police violations of the waste
prohibition. One-sided government enforcement of private access controls
that leaves the government with "nothing... to do" would represent a total
abrogation of the government's duty to uphold the waste prohibition.
The DMCA may be viewed as an attempt by the government to
reconcile the competing interests of self-enforcement and self-help for fair
use discussed earlier.'8 The increasing digitalization of intangible goods
creates an increased ability to erect enclosures that are unaccommodating to
175. This market failure may be a part of the category of "intermediate market failures,"
which Gordon defines as cases "where the market cannot be relied upon to generate all desirable
exchanges, but where some such transactions would be possible." See Gordon, supra note 165, at
1618-22.
176. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified
in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.); see also Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright Legislation for the
"Digital Millennium," 23 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 137 (1999) (detailing the evolution and
structure of the DMCA).
177. 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2000).
178. See id.
179. Samuelson, supra note 46, at 117, 125.
180. See supra text accompanying notes 119-120.
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fair use but also enables the laborer to price-discriminate in a more fine-
grained manner, thereby allowing laborers to more fully avoid violating the
waste prohibition. First considering low-value users, increasing
digitalization enables sellers to offer product differentiation-second-
degree price discrimination-on a much larger scale than ever before. In
Jessica Litman's words, "Until very recently, a copyright holder had no
means to instruct a book that it should sprout wings and fly back to its
publisher after it had been read N times .... ,,181 Increased digitalization
also offers broad opportunities for third-degree price discrimination. An
example of this is Amazon.com's temporary use of consumer information,
such as geography, previous purchases, and past spending patterns to price-
discriminate among consumers at its site.' 82 In addition to the privacy
implications such a regime entails, both second- and third-degree price
discrimination also include some measure of lumpiness. Therefore,
provisions that exempt additional classes of individuals from the
anticircumvention prohibition are necessary from a Lockean perspective.
Although DMCA provisions such as sections 1008 and 1201(a)(2) contain
limited exemptions, they likely do not include all those that might be
legitimate or required under Lockean theory. 8 3 The government would,
therefore, need to balance its obligations under the natural law much more
carefully to prevent violations of the waste prohibition for low-value users.
Low-value uses represent a much larger problem for the legitimacy of
the DMCA anticircumvention provisions. The relatively large set of
potential uses to which any intangible good may be put will far outstrip the
newly enhanced ability to market different types of uses. As the increased
barriers that prevent arbitrage and illicit copying of a good are also likely to
impair significantly these legitimate uses, a potentially large violation of the
waste prohibition will result from the enactment of anticircumvention
provisions. This more seriously calls into question the legitimacy of the
DMCA under a Lockean regime.
2. Fair Use for Drug Patents
The patent regime that currently exists in the United States is not
cognizable in a Lockean state of nature but may be allowable with
modification under a civil government. An impermissible aspect of such a
patent regime in the state of nature is the right given to owners to prohibit
181. Jessica Litman, Reforming Information Law in Copyright's Image, 22 U. DAYTON L.
REV. 587, 601 (1997). The deregulated airline industry is often cited as the primary example in
recent economic history of extensive price discrimination, using product characteristics such as
advance purchase, nonrefundability, and Saturday night stays to differentiate between high-value
and low-value users. See Weiss & Mehrotra, supra note 84, 1 5-9.
182. Weiss & Mehrotra, supra note 84, 1-4, 10-14.
183. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 1008, 1201.
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others from independently producing the intangible good.' 84 Although the
independent production principle is a requirement in the state of nature,
under a civil government the independent production right may be alienated
through majority consent.
A transition to a civil government does not, however, alter the waste
prohibition's applicability because it does not operate on the consent of the
laborer or the user. Therefore, a fair use right must be provided in both the
state of nature and under a civil government. While the U.S. system allows
for a fair use right in copyright, no coherent fair use right is allowed in
patents. Although doctrines such as the experimental use provision may
create a limited fair use right in certain situations,"8 5 a more refined patent
fair use doctrine would be demanded by Lockean theory.
Although it is beyond the scope of this Note to operationalize such a
patent fair use right, the currently intense drug patent debate provides a
stark example of the morally compelling nature of such a right.' 86 Even
though Locke argues that the state of nature is a state of equality, 87 this
equality is limited to equality of opportunity, not equality of wealth or
ability. 188 The waste prohibition, however, does establish that low-value
users have a fair use right to the intangible goods, which may import some
measure of redistributional equity, because one characteristic that will tend
to identify a low-value user is socioeconomic status.
The existence of a large class of low-value users can be substantiated
by the numerous claims that have been made that many people in
developing countries are unable to afford drugs at the price set by the patent
holders. Regarding the AIDS pandemic in China, a local doctor stated, "I
know how to treat these people, but I don't have the drugs, and the patients
184. See Hettinger, supra note 17, at 44 (finding that patents "clearly run afoul" of Lockean
principles due to an improper restriction on independent production). Hettinger's analysis is
flawed, however, because he does not consider important differences between the state of nature
and civil government.
185. O'Rourke, supra note 144, at 1192-93. Although not relying on a Lockean perspective,
O'Rourke has argued that a patent fair use doctrine should be developed because patents may be
subject to the same market defects as those that create the need for copyright fair use. Id. at 1187.
She suggests a five-factor test to operationalize a patent fair use doctrine. These factors
incorporate social ideals that do not directly map onto the requirements of the waste prohibition,
but might be a good start for determining how to operationalize a Lockean fair use ight. She finds
the following relevant to fair use:
(i) the nature of the advance represented by the infringement; (ii) the purpose of the
infringing use; (iii) the nature and strength of the market failure that prevents a license
from being concluded; (iv) the impact of the use on the patentee's incentives and
overall social welfare; and (v) the nature of the patented work.
Id. at 1205.
186. Another way in which a Lockean right to fair use of drug patents might be sustainable is
through Locke's subsistence proviso. For a description of the subsistence proviso, see supra note
37.
187. LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE, supra note 1, § 4.
188. See id. §§ 34-36, 47-48; Sterk, supra note 17, at 1234 (describing Lockean theory as an
"equality-of-opportunity theory").
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can't pay."'' 9 A Nigerian representative has argued that his country has
little money to help its three million people with HIV and so turns to
Indian-made generic drugs that cost substantially less.' 90 The concerns
transcend the AIDS issue, as new malaria drugs create the ability to save
hundreds of thousands of patients, but the cost of $1.30 per dose is
sufficiently higher than the existing treatment's cost of $0.25 per dose that
African health ministries continue to prescribe the cheaper but less effective
treatment.' 9' Jean Lanjouw has provided additional empirical support for
the existence of a large class of low-value users, showing that the assertion
of monopoly power provides little profits to the patent holder but creates a
great loss to those who would be able to purchase the good at greater than
the cost of producing the drug.
192
Establishing the existence of low-value users also establishes a Lockean
fair use right for those users. To the extent that patent holders are unable or
unwilling to sell the patented drugs at affordable prices, these low-value
users have a Lockean fair use right. Additionally, although affordable drug
pricing is admittedly not a full solution to the problem, the developing
countries' moral claim asserts that the patent drug issue is not one of
incentives, but of rich against poor. An Ethiopian representative claimed
that "[p]atents are a system to help the most powerful people who need the
least protection, even while millions of poor AIDS patients are dying." 193
This claim seems particularly incisive after the United States government's
near abrogation of Bayer's patent rights in the anti-anthrax drug Cipro after
the terrorist attacks in late 2001.194
IV. CONCLUSION
This Note has applied the principles set forth in Locke's Two Treatises
of Government to determine the existence and scope of property rights in
intangible goods. To this end, the Treatises have been treated as an
authoritative text, but American intellectual property law has tended to
189. Peter S. Goodman, In China, AIDS Crisis Is at the Mercy of Global Commerce, WASH.
POST, Dec. 5, 2002, at Al.
190. Sebastian Mallaby, Editorial, Talking Cadillacs to Rickshaw Riders, WASH. POST, Oct.
7, 2002, at A19.
191. Karl Vick, Aid Group: Malaria Drug Need Is Ignored: Africans Still Rely on Inferior
Therapy, WASH. POST, Feb. 14, 2002, at A30.
192. Jean 0. Lanjouw, A Patent Policy Proposal for Global Diseases (Apr. 2001), at
http://econ.worldbank.org/files/1733_lanjouw.pdf. Although gaining fair use to drugs produced
for developed nations benefits developing nations, there is almost no investment in treating
diseases that primarily afflict developing nations. Id.
193. Mallaby, supra note 190.
194. Shankar Vedantam & Terence Chea, Drug Firm Plays Defense in Anthrax Scare: For
Now, U.S. Declines To Suspend Bayer's Patent and Authorize Generic Cipro, WASH. POST, Oct.
21, 2001, at A14.
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reject the natural law framework. Instead, the United States has adopted a
utilitarian framework, focusing on the incentives that must be given to
laborers to produce intangible goods. What, then, can a Lockean theory of
property in intangible goods teach us about U.S. intellectual property?
First, the analysis demonstrates the need to consider carefully the
special characteristics of intangible goods that make them so sharply
different from tangible goods. The waste prohibition set out by Locke
quickly becomes a nonissue for tangible goods when a money system has
been introduced. As I have shown, however, this result changes
dramatically when one considers the nonrivalrous nature of intangible
goods. That a prominent theory justifying property rights produces such
different conclusions when one considers the differences between tangible
and intangible goods suggests that one must take care to consider the
special characteristics of intangible goods when making intellectual
property policy decisions.
Second, although U.S. doctrine has disavowed use of natural law
concepts in determining the scope of intellectual property rights, proponents
often use natural law arguments to justify expansion of intellectual property
rights that should be balanced against the natural law arguments for the fair
use right described in this Note. Take, for example, the RIAA's use of
natural-law-type arguments to sway policy decisions regarding peer-to-peer
music sharing, quoting Art Alexakis of Everclear as saying, "I think the fact
that Napster is stealing recorded music is something that we have to
stop.... That's the way I look at it. It's wrong. It's inherently wrong. It's
stealing," and Alanis Morissette as claiming that the artist "should be the
person who's ultimately in a position to decide when, where, and how
something should be shared with whomever they choose to share it
with."'1 95 Alexakis's claim against "stealing" and Morissette's claim for
artistic control rights are natural law arguments rather than arguments about
the socially optimal level of property rights. To the extent that they are used
to provide additional justification for the existing regime of strong property
rights for intangible goods owners or are presented as justification for
additional rights, the Lockean theory developed in this Note can be used as
a counterargument. In fact, the use of natural law arguments may work
against marketers of intangible goods because the extensive nature of the
Lockean waste prohibition may limit intellectual property rights even more
than the incentives-based system currently in place, with one example being
a mandatory patent fair use right.
Finally, the waste prohibition has moral appeal that is similar to the
moral appeal that supports Locke's theory of private property rights. There
195. Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am., The Napster Lawsuit, at http://www.riaa.org/
Napster.cfim (last visited Oct. 29, 2002).
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is something intuitively appealing about giving a property right in
controlling a good to the creator of that good, especially where no others
have been harmed by this creation. By that same token, it is intuitively
appealing to provide a fair use right where the owner is letting the good
spoil and waste, especially if it can be done without harming the owner.
Just as one might find the rock stars' argument that they ought to be
compensated compelling, one would find compelling the claims by Third
World governments that perfectly exclusive private property rights are
inappropriate when the resulting waste-the deadweight loss-is actual
human suffering and death.
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